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Abstract 
This study attempts to analyse the global economic system in light of the ongoing 
financial crisis, which is seen as a symptom of a larger crisis of the legitimacy of the 
capitalist system. It takes a critical approach based, first and foremost, on the theories 
of Karl Marx. To broaden this application, it also adopts the perspective of the World 
Systems and neo-Gramscian schools of thought. The study analyses, and synthesises, 
the theoretical contributions of these approaches, allowing for the conceptualisation of a 
World System, based upon the tenets of capitalism, with a hegemon, the United States 
of America, at its apex. Using the historical materialist method, it traces the genesis and 
progress of the capitalist model. It analyses the particular style of accumulation which 
precipitated the current crisis. From there it examines the situation in the semi-
periphery, the locus of past socialist revolutions.  
To this end, it regards the case of South Africa, an intermediary, between the 
industrialised core and the underdeveloped periphery. It uses Robert Cox‟s assessment 
of the importance of social forces in maintaining or supplanting a hegemonic project. 
Although the study finds South African society fraught with contradictions, alternative 
social movements currently remain unable to produce a coherent emancipatory 
programme. While the crisis, and other recent events, have illuminated the 
contradictions inherent to capitalism, despite widespread popular mobilisation, coherent 
responses from the Left remain deficient. The hegemonic structures and institutions are 
bereft of the necessary prescriptions for a resolution to the situation, yet in this moment 
of opportunity, the Left appears unable to articulate and mobilise sufficiently to bring 
about an emancipatory, counter-hegemonic, movement. 
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Opsomming  
Hierdie studie probeer om die globale ekonomiese stelsel binne die konteks van die 
voortslepende finansiële krisis Hierdie krisies word beskou as „n simptoom van „n meer 
omvattende krisies onderliggend aan die legitimiteit van die kapitalistiese stelsel.. Dit 
volg in die eerste plek ŉ kritiese benadering gebaseer op die teorieë van Karl Marx. . 
Om hierdie toepassing te verbreed, word daar ook gebruik gemaak van die 
Wêreldstelsel- en neo-Gramscian denkskole. Die studie analiseer en sintetiseer, die 
teoretiese bydraes van hierdie benaderings, met inagneming van die konseptualisering 
van ŉ Wêreldstelsel, gebaseer op die beginsels van kapitalisme, met ŉ hegemoon, die 
Verenigde State van Amerika, aan sy spits. Met behulp van die historiese 
materialistiese metode gaan dit die wordingsgeskiedenis en verloop van die 
kapitalistiese model na. Dit analiseer die besondere vorm van akkumulasie wat 
grondliggend is aan die huidige krisis. Daarna ondersoek dit die situasie in die semi-
periferie, die lokus van vorige sosialistiese revolusies.  
Met daardie doel voor oë fokus die tesis op die geval van Suid-Afrika, ŉ tussenganger, 
tussen die geïndustrialiseerde kern en die onderontwikkelde periferie. Daar word bevind 
dat die die Suid-Afrikaanse samelewing vol teenstrydighede is, maar, nietemin, 
alternatiewe sosiale bewegings tans nie daartoe in staat is om ŉ koherente 
emansipatoriese program tot stand te bring nie. Terwyl die krisies en ander gebeure, lig 
gewerp het op die teenstrydighede inherent aan kapitalisme, ontbreek, desondanks 
wydverspreide algemene mobilisering, koherente reaksies vanuit die Linksgesinde 
kamp. . Die hegemoniese strukture en instellings ly gebrek aan lewensvatbare 
voorskrifte vir „n oplossing en Linksgesindes, nieteenstaande die opportunistiese 
oomblik, is nie daartoe in staat is om te ŉ emansipatoriese, teen-hegemoniese 
beweging te artikuleer en te mobiliseer nie.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
“I believe that banking institutions are more dangerous to our liberties than 
 standing armies. If the American people ever allow private banks to control 
 the issue of their currency, first by inflation, then by deflation, the banks 
 and corporations that will grow up around the banks will deprive the 
 people of all property until their children wake-up homeless on the 
 continent their fathers conquered” 
3rd US President Thomas Jefferson 1802; cited in Hoogvelt, (2010; 52). 
“Neither a borrower nor a lender be, for loan oft loses both itself and friend “ 
 Shakespeare, W. (1.3.75-76) 
The contradictions and systemic problems in the global economic order have come to 
the fore since the current financial crisis began in 2007. From its origin in the United 
States of America (US), it has spread throughout the world, rapidly eroding faith in the 
financial system and the ideology which underpins it. The crisis has been responsible 
for widespread impoverishment in both the developed and developing world. Remedies 
and solutions have been implemented and, as of yet, none can be said to have 
succeeded as a universal cure. Rather, leaders stumble from one seemingly ad hoc 
decision to the next with policies and implementations characterised by their reactionary 
nature. However, the crisis requires a broader perspective than simply that of the 
demise of the sub-prime mortgage market and onwards. The organisational structure 
which supported the system must be queried, with a critical view towards how such a 
construct, which drove deepening inequality and engendered crises, came to be. It also 
must be understood as more than simply a crisis in the financial system, but rather a 
crisis of legitimacy for the capitalist system itself. 
This research attempts to obtain the necessary holistic outlook. It will examine the 
evolution of the global economic structures from a historical materialist perspective. It 
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will regard events of the present as the greatest crisis in organisational legitimacy since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s, a time which saw terrible conflict and dislocation, 
but also resulted in a transformation of world order and organisation. It will posit that 
these events provide a similar opportunity for systemic change through an examination 
of the possibility for a successful transformation emanating from movements counter to 
the hegemonic model, both in the core and the periphery. South Africa will be examined 
as a case study to understand the effects of the crisis in the semi-periphery. 
This chapter will begin with a brief conceptualisation of the contemporary setting and 
how it has evolved. It will then discuss the purpose of the study, the research questions, 
the methodology employed, and the motivations for the research. It will outline a 
preliminary theoretical framework. Lastly, it will elaborate upon the structure of the 
thesis. Through this framework, the malaise from which the current global economic 
system suffers and the need for a transformational change will be demonstrated. It will 
find that the financial crisis has been accompanied by a crisis in legitimacy for the 
hegemonic order. However, the weakness and incoherence of possible counter-
movements make it unlikely that, despite the opportune moment, the crisis will result in 
an emancipatory transformation. 
1.1 Background 
The global economic system is in an ongoing period of crisis. The financial crisis began 
in 2007, when bad home-owners debts were packaged and sold throughout the 
financial system, which has had significant ramifications throughout the global economic 
system (McNally, 2009). It included a lack of liquidity and confidence between banks, as 
no one was certain of what was contained on others‟, or even their own, balance 
sheets. The threat of the banking and financial system‟s collapse caused widespread 
distress. In effect, the financial institutions were holding a gun to their own heads, 
threatening to bring about chaos through their demise (Schaffler and Tofall, 2012). The 
threat worked; elected public representatives blinked first. In an attempt to solve the 
problems, massive funds were appropriated from the public purse, through government 
bailouts and other mechanisms, and distributed to the malignant institutions.  
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The events could be viewed as stemming from simple problems. Prospective 
homeowners lacked foresight and took out mortgages when they simply should not 
have. Banks and bankers also suffered from this “irrational exuberance” (Greenspan, 
1996). The ability to have a piece of land to call one‟s own is something to which many 
aspire. In the US, land ownership is a core tenet of „the American Dream‟. With a 
minimal payment and using one‟s future as collateral, this could be possessed. That 
many borrowers would be unable to repay their loans should have been clear to actors 
in the banking and loans industry. Yet, despite this insight, these financial actors, as 
well as their managers, and other individuals who traded in arcane financial 
instruments, would reap material rewards for subjecting individuals to these 
agreements.  
A simple problem requires a simple solution. A lack of liquidity and confidence in the 
financial system could be solved through a recapitalisation of the banks, through 
mechanisms such as the Troubled Assets Relief Package, an initiative targeted to 
support the banks and financial institutions rather than the struggling individual 
(Nesvetailova and Palan, 2008: 171; Ghosh and Mohamed, 2010). The managers of the 
investment vehicles which had behaved most egregiously would be sent on their way 
with a „golden handshake‟. Everyone could breathe a collective sigh of relief and the 
world could go back to normal. 
However appealing this vision, it unfortunately did not come to pass. The US has not 
recovered. The government suffers from partisan bickering while the debt rises by 
trillions, notably with $700 billion going to bailout the banks in 2008 (Nguyen and 
Enomoto, 2009). Unemployment is high and industry seems to be continuing its steady 
decline, if not death spiral. Both sides of the political spectrum are angry; the Tea Party 
and Occupy Wall Street movement are both manifestations of this discontent. 
Individuals who have lost their homes sleep in tents. If this is the product of the 
American Dream, it is a cruel and mocking dystopia. 
In the European Union (EU), the situation also appears grim (Filipovic, 2012). Billions 
were spent on their side of the Atlantic to recapitalise banks as well (Fratianni and 
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Marchionne, 2010). Yet, it still appears as if it was not enough, as these institutions 
continue to require assistance. As public funds move to the private sector, states and 
governments are left with their own creditworthiness in a dubious position (Arellano, 
Conesa and Kehoe, 2012). The end of the Euro, at least in its current form, is the 
source of endless pages of speculation in journals and newspapers. High level summits 
come and go, characterised by discord and resolutions insufficient to address the dire 
situation. Unemployment is problematic, especially in the most affected countries. 
Public servants go unpaid. Riots occur on the streets of Greece and London. The 
individuals protesting have legitimate grievances; they were deceived by the leaders in 
whom they put their trust. 
The global North faces the most extreme economic crisis since the Great Depression. 
The 1930s experienced high unemployment, growing inequality and a crisis in the 
financial system. The period also saw a conflict which subsumed much of the world, 
leaving millions dead, with countries destroyed physically, economically, and politically. 
It led to the use of a doomsday technology in the atom bomb, which killed hundreds of 
thousands and crippled many more.  
The aftermath of this conflict brought about a relative stability. The world was balanced 
by two great powers. Europeans, traumatized by the devastation of the war, vowed 
„never again‟, and began creating a regional infrastructure to preclude the recurrence of 
such horrors. The United Nations came into being which, along with the Bretton Woods 
institutions, was hoped would provide a forum for discussion and decision-making to 
support the stability of the world order (Rodrik, 2009). In many areas, decolonisation 
afforded previously marginalised peoples choices and chances which had been 
nonexistent since the advent of the dark colonial ages.  
Economic crises, in the last century or over a longer time period, have in the past had 
morbid ramifications. Yet, the nature of a crisis prompts a reorientation and redefinition 
of systems and societies. This can be to society‟s benefit, as in the aftermath of World 
War II. It can also have negative results. The recession of the 1870s led to renewed 
colonialism and imperialism, perhaps best exemplified by the 1884 Berlin Conference, 
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where the decisions made by a handful of elite statesmen shattered the independence 
of millions (Arendt, 1967). The 1970s recession ended the postwar stability and gave 
preference to capital and those who controlled it. There is a growing cleavage “between 
the beneficiaries of globalization, on the one hand, and the marginalized, the excluded 
and those who would refuse globalization, on the other” (Cox and Schechter, 2002: xix). 
Past successful socialist revolutions, notably the USSR and Communist China, 
occurred not in the core but in areas more weakly attached to the major industrial area. 
This provides an impetus to examine the current situation from the perspective of a 
semi-peripheral area, which, in keeping with previous historical developments, should 
offer a greater possibility of a radical economic transformation than states and societies 
in the core. South African society is riddled with inequality and contradictions. Their 
governing coalition of interests does not constitute a hegemonic project. However, 
despite the lack of legitimacy, and a widespread dissatisfaction amongst the populace, 
the possibility of a transformative change remains unlikely. This is mainly due to the 
weakness of the possible counter-movements, whether through general disorganisation 
or, as is often the case, co-option by the ruling interests. This will be discussed further in 
Chapter 4. Keeping in mind the aforementioned facts, as well as the magnitude of the 
current crisis, the future of global economic organisation must be questioned. 
1.2 Research Questions 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the evolution of the global financial system and 
its means of accumulation. This will be done with the intent of understanding the current 
financial crisis and to understand whether this is simply a crisis, albeit a significant one, 
in the face of which capitalism will prove resilient as it has in the past, or whether the 
magnitude of this crisis could cause a transformative change in the global economic, 
capitalist, organisation. A number of subsidiary questions can be listed: What historical 
processes led to this current crisis? Is the crisis to result in a restructuring of the global 
economic system? If so, do the balance of social forces permit this restructuring to be of 
an emancipatory nature? 
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1.3 Methodology 
The methodology will establish a theoretical framework through which the global 
economic system will be analysed. Drawing on secondary literature, it will use a 
historical materialist perspective to understand how this system evolved over time and 
how it culminated in the current crisis. It will also regard factors which would suggest 
that the crisis is not yet over, and, rather than improving, is likely to deepen. A case 
study of South Africa, to be explained later in this Chapter, will be examined to gain 
greater insight into the experience in the semi-periphery and if there exists the 
possibility of an emancipatory change in that area.  
This short examination will begin with an explanation of the value of a South African 
case study followed by an understanding of the South African situation in regards to the 
financial crisis. The purpose of a case study is to “construct representations based on 
in-depth, detailed knowledge of cases” (Neumann, 2011: 42; cf. Ragin, 1994: 92). They 
provide the opportunity to “link abstract ideas in specific ways with the concrete 
specifics of cases we observe in detail” (Neumann, 2011: 42). In this example, the 
abstraction will be the global economic organisation and the specific case to 
demonstrate the implications of this system will be South Africa. Through this, the 
theories of historical materialism, and the effects of the global economic system, which 
in itself is far from a substantive construct, will be extrapolated to a more micro-level, 
which permits the ability to “develop richer, more comprehensive explanations that can 
capture the complexity of social life” (Neumann, 2011: 42). The examination of South 
Africa meets Johansson‟s criteria for a case study in that it is a complex functioning unit, 
contemporary and investigated in its natural context (Johansson, 2003: 2). This study 
takes a “qualitative and interpretive” approach to the case, and attempts to gain a 
holistic perspective (Johansson, 2003: 3). An explanatory model, rather than an 
experimental one will be followed to understand the case. An experimental process 
would focus on a testable hypothesis and follow “experimental logic to draw causal 
inferences” (George and Bennett, 2004: 151). The explanatory approach that will be 
used in the study gives the opportunity to obtain “rich explanations of particular cases”, 
with the trade-off of being unable to provide a universal conclusion. (George and 
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Bennett, 2004: 31). However, given the complexity and dynamics of the case involved, it 
is believed that the parsimony which must be sacrificed to appropriately examine the 
case at hand is worthwhile. Thus, it focuses on the contemporary situation, but also 
places this within a historical context. South Africa is selected as it is “information-rich, 
critical, revelatory [and] unique” (Johansson, 2003: 8). The conclusions drawn from this 
will pertain to South Africa alone, however, but could “be useful for those who wish to 
generalise and draw comparisons with similar state-society complexes” (Leysens, 2012: 
3). 
1.4 Motivations 
There are several motivations for undertaking this study. The researcher is confronted 
by the contradictions and widespread problems engendered by the current 
manifestation of the global economic system which follows the logic of hyper-capitalism, 
an ideology which flourishes on the development of ever-faster moving technology and 
is characterised by the illusory rather than the concrete. (Graham, 2000) This logic 
applies to capital and the speculative nature of many of its modern manifestations. 
Alongside this is the fact that deep inequalities exist between areas of the world, and 
also within societies, which is deeply perplexing. This is exemplified by the fact that “the 
richest 1 percent of the world‟s adult population, individuals worth at least $514,512, 
ow[n] 39.9 percent of the world‟s household wealth, a total greater than the wealth of 
the world‟s poorest 95 percent” (Inequality.org, n.d.; cf. United Nations, 2006). This 
cleavage is staggering and also has ramifications on health and other aspects of social 
well-being (Inequality.org, n.d.). Global inequality is not the only issue. Inequality within 
states is also problematic. South Africa, for example, was found to have a Gini 
coefficient, a measure of inequality within a state, of 0.64 in 2010, one of the highest 
rates in the world (World Bank, n.d.). When this is compared to a country in the global 
North, such as Canada, which reported a measure of 0.324 in the late 2000s, it shows 
that there are large disparities both between and within societies. (OECD.statsextracts, 
n.d.) These measurements clearly suggest that, with the exception of those in privileged 
positions, for the vast majority of individuals in the world, the global economic system is 
not functioning properly. Poverty is widespread, natural environments are destroyed, 
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and for many the future is bleak (Altvater, 2009: 77). There is “a passive, soft 
leadership, with no experience in a world unchained in its anger. In classic social 
analysis this is often described as degeneracy” (Saul, 2009: 288). 
The ongoing economic crisis could provide a bookend for this era. At the very least, it 
prompts a deeper study and further understanding of economic systems, as the 
ramifications of these current events are both broad and deep. It also begs an 
understanding of how this came to pass, whether due to simple errors which have been 
compounded on a global scale, or through a perversion of systems purported to protect 
and uplift individuals. With one foot rooted in historical process, and the other planted in 
an analysis of the present times, it is then possible to regard alternatives for the future. 
The study will analyse how the current instability could lead to emancipatory change in 
the, hopefully near, future.  
1.5 Theory and Conceptualisation 
The theoretical framework will be discussed at length in Chapter Two. The study, in 
general, will use a historical materialist perspective. This will synthesise a number of 
different strands of the theory. Marx‟s writings and beliefs will be the foundation upon 
which the theoretical framework is built. The theories which followed in this tradition 
have many similarities but also significant are their differences. Following Marx, for the 
purpose of this research, the next group of theories which will be explored will be 
grouped under the label of „World Systems Theory‟. These writings examined Marx‟s 
theories regarding class conflict within Europe and extrapolated it to relations on a 
global scale. They focus on a very structural interpretation of the functioning of the world 
system in its totality, with each region and society having a role to play defined by where 
they exist in the global hierarchy. One of the schools of thought in this group is the 
notion of dependencía, which began in Latin America. Another is Immanual 
Wallerstein‟s formal World Systems Theory. Between these two approaches, there are 
many commonalities and even scholars who subscribe to aspects of both theories. (see 
Prebisch, 1959; Wallerstein, 1974; Arrighi, 2005) The next school of thought which will 
be focused on is based upon the contributions of Antonio Gramsci and neo-
Gramscians. Gramsci wrote at length of the notion of hegemony to understand why 
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Marx‟s class struggles had not yet produced a revolution in Western Europe. From this 
one can conceptualise a capitalist World System with the US as a hegemonic power. 
Existing within this structure, and the subject Chapter 4, is South Africa. For this, Robert 
Cox‟s (1987) World Order Approach provides useful analytical tools to understand how 
the conflict and balancing of social forces can produce or preclude change. The major 
commonality between all of these theoretical approaches is that they analyse 
inequalities and the struggle toward emancipation. They are therefore useful as 
explanatory frameworks for understanding how the global economic order is organised 
and to comprehend the present crisis.  
1.5.1 Formation of the Global Economic Order 
Marx and Engels view history as being comprised of the struggle between capital and 
labour. (Marx and Engels, 2010: 6) This conflict is what produces change. Victories are 
achieved on both sides. In the case of capital, the ever-increasing growth of the market, 
from its inception to its current global iteration had stark effects on individuals. For the 
newly initiated, “the contractual organizations of kinship, neighbourhood, profession, 
and creed were to be liquidated since they claimed the allegiance of the individual,” 
(Polanyi, 1944: 163) and would thereby impede his ability to participate fully in the free 
market. Despite the increased personal freedom such a system can engender, the 
results of commodifying and surrendering oneself to the objective, asocial market are 
mixed at best. 
Alternatively, social protection systems were designed, this constituting a victory of sorts 
by labour over capital. Their purpose was opposed to the free market and intended “to 
destroy such an institution and make its existence impossible” (Polanyi, 1944: 177). In a 
historical perspective, the labour market and individuals were allowed to continue to 
work within the market system as long as the institutional protections ensured that work 
conditions and wages remained at a level which did not degrade the individual and 
permitted dignity and a certain standard of living and working. The argument posited by 
free market adherents that such legislation and regulations, minimum wages, 
unemployment insurance, and the ability to organize trade unions, distort the labour 
market is seen by many as correct. Yet if they have not impacted “the mobility of labor 
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and flexibility of wages […] those institutions have entirely failed in their purpose, which 
was exactly that of interfering with the laws of supply and demand in respect to human 
labor, and removing it from the orbit of the market” (Polanyi, 1944: 177). 
Polanyi wrote of a „disembedded market‟, which he referred to as a “Satanic Mill” 
(Polanyi, 1944: 32) – a phrase used in William Blake‟s poetry to describe London during 
the Industrial Revolution, a reflection which is similar to Marx, the latter being discussed 
in Section 2.2 (Blake, 1907). This market would later push “labour into misery, nature 
into environmental destruction, and the monetary system into a bad running order” 
(Altvater, 2009: 77). One can extrapolate from the system which Polanyi examined at 
the time to the current global financial market, where “the horizon is not the national 
economy with its institutional settings and social and political regulations but the 
unfettered world market – that is, the poorly regulated economy on a global scale” 
(Altvater, 2009: 77). Today‟s markets have an almost insatiable appetite for information 
and function on a twenty-four hour cycle around the world. The speed and magnitude of 
this system breeds short-sightedness among the financial actors who ply their trade 
amongst its waters. In this extraordinarily fast-paced system the horizon is always near. 
There exists a method of function based upon the “higher the interest rate and the 
financial yield, the shorter the perspective of actors within the financial markets”, which 
simultaneously devours the world through a slow, long term process (Altvater, 2009: 
77). Thus „counter-movements‟ protecting labour, money, nature and the individual, 
must also develop or be prepared for rapid action, while maintaining a “global and long 
term perspective” (Altvater, 2009: 77).  
1.5.2 Present opportunities for counter-hegemonic movements 
The economic crisis in the North, and the likelihood that its impact will worsen in the 
South, provides “a moment to highlight the systemic failings of capitalism and the need 
for a radical alternative” (McNally, 2008: 79). Mainstream alternatives are simply a 
failure of imagination. The global economic organisation, through its development over 
the last centuries, has brought about the current crisis which affects individuals around 
the world. As there has not, yet, been a marked departure or transformation from the 
broad economic policies of the recent past, it is likely that the crisis will worsen, 
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furthering “a legitimation crisis affecting both states and the institutions of global 
governance,” (Cox and Schechter, 2002: xix), whether economic or political. The 
disparities of distribution of wealth and associated living standards across the world 
continue to deepen (Altvater, 2009: 75). This situation demonstrates that the current 
global organisation is on the cusp of a transformation once again. The power and 
values which sustain and are promoted by the system are now, more than ever, under 
examination. They are “a paradigm of social reality, which does not spring from human 
volition” (Polanyi, 1944: 254). The illusion of freedom, central to the thought of a „free‟ 
market, was maintained “only at the price of blindness to the wider consequences of 
individual action” (Polanyi, 1944: 254). The complex and integrated society, in which we 
live, is failing; and with this failure the illusion of freedom fades. The liberal capitalist 
ideology which has been the foundation of the dominant Western societies has driven 
the global economy into a crisis. To find true freedom one must begin to consider 
alternatives. 
The crisis has produced a number of physical manifestations of movements counter to 
the hegemonic project. They are occurring in disparate areas of the world as an 
expression of the dissatisfaction with the current world order. However, a few of these 
demonstrations have garnered global attention of late. The Arab Spring was another 
expression of this, albeit in a different political and economic climate. The European 
Union has also been affected. As their sovereign debt crisis mounts, alongside imposed 
austerity measures, individuals react on the streets. Greece, one of the countries which 
has experienced the most severe effects of this situation, has seen over 900 protests in 
the course of a year (McNally, 2012: 50; cf. Regully, 2011). Though there is a growing 
frustration with the world order, the counter movements are generally characterised as 
not being “guided by any particular political philosophy or leanings but by the pragmatic 
need to resist displacement and dispossession” (Harvey, 2010: 258) This most often 
occurs to local issues and problems rather than global dynamics, which fosters a lack of 
international cohesion amongst these movements. The critical academic discourse 
which the crisis has precipitated, which will be discussed in Chapter 2, also lacks 
coherence. (See Homer-Dixon 2011; Wallerstein, 2011; McNally, 2012; Burnham, 2009) 
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Though ample motivation for a challenge to the capitalist world order exists, the left has 
yet to articulate and mobilise a serious unified attempt. Yet, as the crisis deepens and 
dissatisfaction grows, the opportunities for such do not disappear.These movements 
could, perhaps, constitute a challenge to the hegemonic project of capitalist liberal 
democracy. At the very least, they represent the dissatisfaction, especially in light of the 
financial crisis, which has marginalised many individuals. A number of the movements, 
such as Occupy Wall Street, the Indignados in Spain, or the popular uprisings 
surrounding the Arab Spring, have garnered much attention, academic and otherwise. 
While they are an indicator of global discontent, and therefore must be acknowledged, 
they will not be the object of analysis for this study. Rather, South Africa will be used as 
a case study. The reason for this is threefold. Firstly, the cases occurring in the global 
North, or their immediate proximity, such as the Arab Spring, have been studied and 
discussed at length in various media. Academically, the majority of literature is 
produced in Europe and North America and it is natural that it would regard internal 
matters or ones which influence, or possibly threaten, society in the North, for example 
stemming from refugee flows or ungoverned/radical states across the Mediterranean. 
South Africa, and its contradictions, receives significantly less attention. This provides 
the opportunity to address a topic which, while not entirely novel, can be said to be 
neglected in many mainstream considerations.  
The second reason for the focus on South Africa‟s is its position in the semi-periphery. 
Cox finds that in our current system, “hegemony is more intense and consistent in the 
core and more laden with contradictions in the periphery” (Cox, 1996: 137). While the 
mobilisation in the North, such as Occupy Wall Street or the Indignados prove 
interesting reading, they do not capture the systemic contradictions to the same degree 
as occurrences in states more towards the periphery of the World System. The final 
reason, also inseparable from the second, is the nature, or lack thereof, of hegemony in 
South Africa. Indeed, the contradictions in this society are stark.  
Following the transition from Apartheid, the coalition of interests which governed the 
country did so in accordance with the hegemonic, neoliberal, model. In the West, at 
least to a relative extent, this model has penetrated deeply into individual‟s daily lives, 
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including corporate and labour structure, and even civil society. Hegemonic consensus 
has not been established in South Africa. This makes the project for a counter 
hegemonic movement in the West more difficult, as it appears that there are few, or no, 
alternatives to the existing structures. This is not the case in peripheral states, as they 
“have not undergone the same thorough social revolution, nor have their economies 
developed in the same way, but they try to incorporate elements from the hegemonic 
model without disturbing old power structures” (Cox, 1996: 137). South Africa is no 
exception to this assessment. While some hegemonic elements were adopted, they 
never achieved legitimacy and the support of the bulk of the population. Thus, the 
governing elites must rely less on consent and more on coercion to achieve their 
objectives. This leaves their position in society weaker than their counterparts in the 
West, and therefore it may be easier for an organised oppositional force to realise a 
transformative success.  
In the past, many writers, including Marx and Lenin (Marx, 2010: Lenin, 1927), 
advocated for a revolution occurring in the core, as the proletariat would no longer 
accept the order and obligations to which they were subjected. (Amin and Luckin, 1996: 
243) Within the core of Europe and North America, capitalism remained steadfast and 
would become modified and more deeply entrenched. (Amin and Luckin, 1996: 243) 
However, this model was called into question by the revolution of the Russian semi-
periphery and the (victorious) liberation struggles in Asia and Africa (Amin, 2010: 262) 
These constituted “the first wave of struggles in favour of the emancipation of the 
workers and the peoples” (Amin, 2010: 262). It would be unwise to claim that South 
Africa carries the same geopolitical significance as Russia in the first half of the 1900s, 
or in the current world organisation. Yet, the value comes from their role in the semi-
periphery, with many linkages to the global North, which struggles through the crisis. 
Past emancipatory movements have occurred in the semi-periphery, rather than the 
developed core or the underdeveloped periphery. As a regional hegemon (in a non- 
Gramsican sense) (Alden and Le Pere, 2004), South Africa has influence on states and 
movements throughout southern Africa. It is also worthwhile to note that the country is a 
member of the BRICS, a constellation of, arguably, semi-peripheral states who have 
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formed a loose alliance to promote their interests on the world stage. South Africa‟s 
position in the global hierarchy, and the severe contradictions engendered by the 
neoliberal capitalist model followed since the end of apartheid, make it an ideal case 
study for understanding the effects of global capitalism on the semi-periphery and the 
possibilities of a revolutionary counter-movement emanating from this area. As a 
“second stage of „the South‟s awakening‟ […] is now on the agenda”, South Africa is in 
a position to harness this possibility to effect change (Amin, 2010: 271). 
Through a spatial reorganisation of capital, it can be expected that the North will try to 
displace their struggles stemming from the crisis onto the global South. South Africa is 
especially vulnerable to this process as it has experienced a growth in debt load and its 
economy is built upon foreign direct investment (Marais, 2009; Cramer et al, 2009). 
South Africa‟s status in the semi-periphery and its dependence on the core economic 
centres for capital is a key factor in its historical and economic development. 
Furthermore, continuing dependence on the core leaves it in a difficult position as the 
North struggles along, and cracks in the façade of the Rainbow Nation appear 
domestically, alongside troubling economic trends. There exist a number of complex 
social and economic problems, not the least of which is a decline in the legitimacy of the 
governing coalition and a rise in coherence of social forces outside these structures. 
These will be examined in an in-depth in Chapter 4. 
1.6 Structure of thesis 
The thesis begins with a general introduction to the topic, methodology, and a basic 
introduction to the theoretical framework of the research. Chapter 2 will elaborate upon 
this and construct a comprehensive theoretical foundation. Chapter 3 will use a 
historical materialist perspective to look at the evolution of the global financial structure 
and how this contributed to and caused the current crisis. It will also take into account 
the current academic discourse which has sprung from these events. Chapter 4 will 
conceptualise the crisis as an opportunity and analyse it using South Africa as a case 
study. Chapter 5 will summarize the research and results. 
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Chapter 2 - Theoretical Framework and Conceptualisation 
[T]he old is dying, and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a 
 great variety of morbid symptoms appear”    
 Antonio Gramsci (1971: 276). 
“This is the way the world ends      
 Not with a bang but a whimper”      
 Eliot T.S. (n.d) 
2.1 Introduction 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the apparent demise of communism at 
the hands of the capitalists, the long history of ideas which stemmed from those 
articulated by Karl Marx could have been seen as discredited. The Soviet state which 
had, for a time, embodied these ideals was no more. Their opponents were victorious. 
Although Communist parties held power in China, North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba, they 
were isolated and “did not constitute a threat to the hegemony of the global capitalist 
system” (Hobden and Wyn Jones, 2001: 201). The Chinese economy had already 
begun its transformation towards capitalism in 1978, (Qian, 1999) and the other 
nominally Communist states, in order to maintain their grip on power after the Soviet 
demise, were forced to pivot towards a capitalist economy. A new century was about to 
dawn and the mainstream practical consensus was that it would be liberal and capitalist. 
Yet, Marx‟s theories and his concept of historical materialism have proven to be more 
resilient than the Communist regimes which, ostensibly, were based on his work. 
Inequalities are apparent around the world. The global economic system lurches from 
crisis to crisis. The current disorder prompts a re-examination of the theories which 
follow in the historical materialist tradition. This chapter will begin with the writings and 
theories of Marx, as any proper examination of the subject must do. It will then compare 
and contrast later interpretations and iterations of his work. Next explored will be the 
theoretical strands which I shall subsume under the label of World System Theory. It will 
then regard the contributions of Antonio Gramsci. These approaches will be used to 
understand the formation and structure of a hegemonic and capitalist World System. 
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From there it will examine the theoretical contributions of Robert Cox, which initialised a 
loose „school‟ of neo-Gramscian approaches to World Order. His approach will heavily 
contribute to the analysis in Chapter 4. Subsequently, this Chapter will regard some 
contemporary critical analyses which have emerged since the start of the financial 
crisis. In its entirety, this will demonstrate that the ideas of historical materialism, in 
different variants, are not obsolete. The financial crisis has shown that they remain 
relevant, if not now more than ever.  
2.2 The Origins of Historical Materialism – Marxist Theory 
An analysis of Historical Materialism should not begin with anyone but Marx. Through 
his prolific writings he developed a theoretical framework which engendered strong 
responses – from anger to confusion to inspiration – in his readers for years. His 
analyses and critiques of the economic order are still pertinent at this time. The critical 
aspects of his writings are incisive and extensive. No less impressive are those which 
describe the capitalist system and its processes of accumulation. These will both be 
explored in the coming section, along with the theoretical basis from which Marx wrote. 
In the Communist Manifesto, co-authored by Friedrich Engels, he advocated the 
advantages of these approaches and of socialist thought in general. This articulation of 
his ideas was intended to refute the assertions of economists and prove the terrible 
effects of capital and land being controlled by the few, while many laboured. “[I]t pointed 
out the inevitable ruin of the petty bourgeoisie and peasant, the misery of the proletariat, 
the anarchy in production, the crying inequalities in the distribution of wealth” (Marx and 
Engels, 2010: 29). It also demonstrated the large- and small-scale effects of this 
disparity, most notably war between nations, and the destruction of moral bonds and 
family relations (Marx and Engels, 2010: 29). These claims may seem ambitious, but 
Marx was nothing if not meticulous in his research and writing. 
Marx believed that the world should be viewed in its entirety. With regard to his most 
significant literary achievement, Das Kapital, he stated that “regarding my work, I will tell 
you the plain truth about it, […] Whatever shortcomings they may have, the advantage 
of my writings is that they are an artistic whole” (Wheen, 2007: 5). Marx would argue 
that reducing the analysis of a subject to different fields of study, by applying the lenses 
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of economics, politics, history, or philosophy separately, provides an imperfect 
understanding of the subject. None can be considered without the other. Marx‟s work 
was both thorough and complex but also left much room for interpretation and re-
interpretation, hence the legacy of thinkers who have followed in his footsteps.  
One of the reasons for the varied understandings of Marxist thought is that he often 
used the method of dialectics in his writing to explore and explain contradictions in the 
world. He adapted this method from Hegel, but it is a method frequently used by 
scholars to comprehend events and structures. Robert Cox would later explain dialectic 
as “a dialogue seeking truth through the explorations of contradictions” (Cox, 1986: 
215). This allows the analyst to understand structure and the possibility of changes “by 
understanding the contradictions and sources of conflict within existing structures; and 
this may be aided by an understanding of how structural transformations have come 
about in the past” (Cox, 1986: 244). In the end, Marx‟s extensive research and carefully-
considered writing produced a theoretical framework which would be debated, and 
remain relevant, for hundreds of years. His “work is as open-ended – and thus as 
resilient – as the capitalist system itself” (Wheen, 2007: 6). 
Marx‟s materialist conception suggests that economic development drives historical 
change. Any changes in society can be seen as a reflection of economics. In his 
opinion, the interaction between the means of production and the relations of production 
constitute the basis of society. A change in the means of production would result in a 
change in the structures which constitute the relations of production. One way the 
means of production can change is through the implementation of new technologies. 
Marx did a great deal of his writing in London during the Industrial Revolution, where 
this entire process of change would have been evident. As the means of production 
change, the previous relations of production, or the ways in which society and labour 
are organised, become outdated and obsolete. Without the destruction of the previous 
relations of production, productive capacity cannot be fully utilised. Those controlling 
capital, also called the bourgeoisie, “cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the 
instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the 
whole relations of society” (Marx and Engels, 2010: 16). Their dependence on the 
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labour of the proletariat, the group consisting of the labourers, demands continued 
enhancements to the means of production. The “revolutionising of production, 
uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation” 
has a decided impact on labour (Marx and Engels, 2010: 16). Social relations, and 
everything with which they are associated, “are swept away, all new-formed ones 
become antiquated before they can ossify” (Marx and Engels, 2010: 16). 
Another key notion which Marx explored was that of surplus value. This is directly 
related to the commodification of labour. In his estimation, transactions were originally 
based upon commodities themselves. Either they were traded directly through a barter 
system, or a commodity, produced by an individual, was sold for money, which was 
then exchanged for another commodity. This type of interaction provides little or no 
opportunity to accumulate capital. However, the process changed with the capitalist 
system. Under this new system, an individual with capital could, with his money, buy 
both a commodity and labour power. Using that labour power, he would produce 
another commodity, for example paying someone to fashion wood into a table. The final 
commodity would then be sold at a profit. This profit would come from the difference in 
wages paid to the labourer. Thus, in a capitalist system, those at the top of the hierarchy 
profit from simply possessing and spending capital, while those at the bottom find they 
have become a commodity like any other (Wheen, 2007: 47). This brief explanation of 
surplus value is extremely truncated as Marx used more than 600 pages to explain it in 
Capital Volume 2 (Burnham, 2010: 30).  
One of Marx‟s constructs, which later scholars would adopt, is the framework of the 
base and superstructure. The base consists of the means of production and the 
relations of production, and their underlying economic considerations. The 
superstructure consists of the “culture, institutions, language” and the role which they 
play in the political process (Wheen, 2007: 104). Changes in the base result in changes 
in the superstructure. The two are in a cyclical and mutually reinforcing relationship. The 
notion of structure is central to World System Theory, Gramscian theory and later 
iterations of the Marxist tradition prior to, and apart from, the advent of post-
structuralism.  
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Marx believed that “[t]he history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class 
struggles” (Marx and Engels, 2010: 14). The capitalist organisation of society breeds 
conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Marx was clear on how this conflict 
was organized and in whose favour. “[W]ages are determined by the fierce struggle 
between capitalist and worker. The capitalist inevitably wins. The capitalist can live 
longer without the worker than the worker can without them” (Wheen, 2007: 14). Capital 
accumulates as labour is further alienated from the products which they create. Rather 
than creating a product, workers instead complete a compartmentalised task which, in 
conjunction with the tasks of other labourers, contributes to a final product, albeit one 
which is disconnected from the task of each individual worker. Further mechanisation 
would increase this process. For the worker, this would result in “the means of his 
existence and of his activity [being] increasingly concentrated in the hands of the 
capitalists” (Wheen, 2007: 14; cf. Marx, 1976). As the power and accumulation of the 
capitalists increase, the workers are left with a grim fate: “overwork and early death, 
reduction to a machine, enslavement to capital” (Wheen, 2007: 14). The workers‟ labour 
and the fruits of it exist “outside him, independently of him, and alien to him, and begins 
to confront him, as an autonomous power; the life which he has bestowed on the object 
confronts him as hostile and alien” (Wheen, 2007: 14). Capital, eventually, will 
“distort the worker into a fragment of a man, [the bourgeoisie] degrade him 
to the level of a machine, they destroy the actual content of his labour by 
turning into a torment; they alienate him from the intellectual potentialities of 
the labour process; they transform his lifetime into working time, and drag 
his wife and  child beneath the juggernaut of capital” (Wheen, 2007: 14). 
This portrait of the conflict between labour and capital is bleak. However, despite this, 
Marx believed that this very conflict, coupled with the inequality and immiseration it 
generated, would precipitate the process of emancipation.  
The bourgeoisie relied upon the proletariat for their very existence. Without the ability to 
extract surplus value from the commodity of labour, “the formation and augmentation of 
capital” would not be possible, and the capitalist class would vanish (Marx and Engels, 
2010: 21). Technological innovation has reduced the role of labour, removing, to a 
certain extent the need to create surplus value from the difference between 
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commodities and wages. Instead, capital is used to acquire technologies which reduce 
dependence on labour, through rapid technological change which throws people out of 
work, (Harvey, 2009), in the form of machines or computerisation which replaces the 
need for a labourer. This, however, is also problematic as it renders labour more 
precarious and decreases the size of the market which would otherwise consume the 
goods produced by capital. „[W]hen labor is disempowered it gets low wages, and if you 
engage in wage repression this limits markets” (Harvey, 2009). The entire process is 
contradictory, because as it occurs the capitalists also seek to earn higher profits as 
labour conditions deteriorate. Thus, the labour class becomes more disenchanted, while 
the capitalist class still requires its existence. This, “therefore, cuts from under its feet 
the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products” 
(Marx and Engels, 2010: 21). In this situation, “the bourgeoisie therefore produces, 
above all […] its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally 
inevitable” (Marx and Engels, 2010: 21). However, Marx was not entirely contemptuous 
of the bourgeoisie. He believed that the bourgeoisie “has been the first to show what 
man‟s activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian 
pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals” (Marx and Engels, 2010: 16). Yet, 
despite these triumphs, “capitalism remains a disaster since it turns people into 
commodities. Until humans can assert themselves as the subjects of history rather than 
its objects, there is no escape from this tyranny” (Wheen, 2007: 13). 
It must be noted that, while the contributions of Marx and Engels are relevant, the notion 
of worker has changed dramatically since the time of their writing. Generally, in the 
current organisation of the world economy, “workers are increasingly expected to 
cultivate an unprecedented repertoire of abilities in an immaterial world of work” (Moore, 
2006: 453). Presently, workers are viewed “less as cogs in the wheel or less as rational 
and predictable entities than as dynamic individuals with the capacity for symbolic 
reasoning, intelligence, independently generated ideas, and even the desire to work for 
self-fulfillment” (Moore, 2006: 453). However, this has not resulted in the working class 
losing their chains, so to speak. Rather, workers face a “contemporary form of coercion 
that substitutes political representation with a set of expectations and limitations 
intended […] to reduce government responsibility for employment welfare” (Moore, 
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2006: 453). In fact, production has shifted “from economies of scale to economies of 
flexibility” (Cox and Schechter, 2002: 81). This is based upon “a core-periphery 
structure of production, with a relatively small core of relatively permanent employees 
handling finance, research and innovation; and a periphery consisting of dependent 
components in the production process” (Cox and Schechter, 2002: 81). This has 
resulted in “a more precariously employed labour force segmented by ethnicity, gender, 
nationality, religion, or geographical location”, a weakening of the power of trade unions, 
and a strengthening of the power of capital (Cox and Schechter, 2002: 81). 
Marx did not remain detached from the ongoing conflict. Rather, he believed that, as he 
wrote in his Theses on Fuerbach, “[t]he philosophers have only interpreted the world. 
The point is to change it” (Wheen, 2007: 23; cf. Marx, 1969). The emancipation of the 
proletariat was the change for which he worked and, in his analysis, the contradictions 
of capitalism would make this outcome inevitable. They would also prove fertile ground 
for the inspiration of many future generations of writers and thinkers. 
2.3 V. I. Lenin – Marxist-Leninism 
An appropriate starting point for the evolution of Marxist thought is the theories of Lenin 
whose adaptations heralded a school of Marxist-Leninism which was embodied in the 
Soviet state. In his text, Imperialism: The Last Stage of Capitalism, he focuses, 
naturally, on the relationship between the coloniser and the colonised. The “propertied 
classes” of the imperial nation would show a “[g]eneral enthusiasm over the prospects 
of imperialism, furious defence of it and painting it in the brightest colours” (Lenin, 1927: 
121). The elite competition between the European powers would result in the “free 
grabbing of territories”, (Lenin, 1927: 138) which, as available land for colonies became 
more scarce, would result in a “particularly intense struggle for the division and the 
redivision of the world” (Lenin, 1927: 104). He found this mode of capitalism to be 
fraught with contradictions and prone to decay (Lenin, 1927: 106).  
Lenin built on the foundations of Marxist thought and also developed them further. He 
did not deviate from the notion that the economic mode of production “ultimately 
determines broader social and political relations” (Hobden and Wyn Jones, 2001: 206). 
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This, in keeping with Marx, was understood as the base-superstructure model. 
Differences arose because the type of world which existed when Marx wrote had 
changed by Lenin‟s time. He termed imperialism as „monopoly capitalism‟, which he 
saw as capitalism‟s highest and final stage (Lenin, 1927: 3). The exploitation of the 
periphery complicates the divergence between the interests of the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie upon which Marx remarks. The profits returned from the colonies to the 
core allows the bourgeoisie to buy off the proletariat, at least enough to keep them 
satisfied. In this manner there is a convergence of interests in the two classes. Lenin‟s 
addition was insightful and useful in its time. It began to conceptualise the global 
system, rather than the Eurocentric and other forms of historical materialism, based 
solely upon class and economics. However, just as the world changed between the time 
of Marx and Lenin, leaving theory not invalidated but subject to a reinterpretation, it 
continued to do so, producing new interpretations of Marx‟s theories.  
2.4 Raul Prebisch - Dependencía 
Raul Prebisch was a Latin American economist who brought the notion of dependencía 
to the fore. The main tenet of this theory was that “the spread of technical progress has 
been uneven, and this has contributed to the division of the world economy into 
industrial centres and peripheral countries engaged in primary production, with 
consequent differences in income growth” (Prebisch, 1959: 251). Essentially, this 
means that the price of manufactured goods rises more quickly than that of raw 
materials. As the core is the primary producer of manufactured items, and the periphery 
is used as a repository of natural resources, those in the periphery remain constantly 
behind in terms of development. Instead, the dependencía school of thought suggested 
that “it was possible for the countries of the South to „develop‟ themselves, as opposed 
to "being developed" by the North.” (Wallerstein, 2004: 1; original emphasis) This notion 
could be seen as a precursor to the more formalised and articulated World System 
Theory of Wallerstein, among others. Prebisch‟s development economics recommends 
import substitution, meaning the building of domestic industry rather than using imports. 
To achieve this, protection, such as tariffs or other barriers, are needed to defend 
domestic markets from more developed ones. Import substitution could have the effect 
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of creating a domestic industrial base, and along with it the jobs which would lift many 
out of poverty (Prebisch, 1959: 253). As the head of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America, he also advocated for inward-development and stronger regional integration 
as solutions to the problems facing the area (The Economist, 2009a). The theories of 
development through import substitution lost much of their credibility in the decades 
surrounding the 1970s. The price increase by OPEC had the effect of a “rise in the cost 
of imports for countries in the South combined with a sharp decline in the value of their 
exports because of the stagnation in the world economy” (Wallerstein, 2004: 2) Import 
substitution could not work under these circumstances, unless the state produced oil, 
and thus there were balance of payments deficits leading to loans from the International 
Financial Institutions in order to keep the states functioning. These loans often went 
unpaid as the situation did not radically improve. The balance of payments deficits 
worsened, and this effectively marked the end of the import substitution strategy in Latin 
America. (Wallerstein, 2004: 2) East Asia has, arguably, shown a degree of success in 
implementing similar policies, which will be discussed towards the end of the 
subsequent section.  
2.5 Immanuel Wallerstein – World System Theory 
Wallerstein analysed the development of the capitalist system by using a historical 
perspective. As capitalism became dominant, it transformed the structures of economic 
and social organisations. No longer did one labour for king and country; rather, there 
now existed a system which magnified and legitimized the “ability of some groups within 
the system to exploit the labour of others, that is, to receive a larger share of the 
surplus” (Wallerstein, 1974: 230). This process occurred first in Europe, and was later 
exported to the periphery through colonialism. In the global North, or the core, labour 
movements were broken by forces controlled by capital, and individuals found 
themselves more subservient to the market. The shift from world empire to world 
system changed the patterns and directions of capital. Instead of a state receiving the 
benefits of world domination, the distribution of capital now flowed in a new direction; 
the economic loss was absorbed by political entities, with the economic gain being 
distributed into private hands (Wallerstein, 1974: 229). This system depends upon 
“creative self-destruction, of rise and demise” (Goldfrank, 2000: 175).  
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With the dominance of capitalism came a new ordering, which Wallerstein termed the 
“core and the periphery” (Wallerstein, 1974: 231). The core is comprised of strong 
states with an integrated national culture, which “serves as both a mechanism to protect 
disparities which have arisen…and as an ideological mask for the maintenance of these 
disparities” (Wallerstein, 1974: 231). The peripheral area comprises states which range 
from non-existent, as seen in a colonial situation, to weak and with a low degree of 
autonomy, as occurs in the present, neo-colonial condition. In these weak states, the 
authorities cannot, or do not, play a role in coordinating “a complex industrial-
commercial- agricultural mechanism” Instead they are simply a set of landlords, 
“contending with other landlords, and hold little claim to legitimate authority of the entire 
state” (Wallerstein, 1974: 231). However, as opposed to core regions with relatively 
strong central leadership, the traditional rulers‟ authority tends to be de jure, rather than 
de facto. 
Within this hierarchy, Wallerstein purports there exists another classification of states, 
one which conforms to the characteristics of neither the core nor the periphery. These 
entities comprise the “semi-periphery”, which exist between the two opposite ends of 
the spectrum, when judged by the “complexity of their economic activities, strength of 
the state machinery, cultural integrity” (Wallerstein, 1974: 231). These states are a 
natural intercessor between the two extremes, consisting of states which had previously 
been members of the core who had declined, or members of the periphery which had 
risen in status and ability. They are a “necessary structural element in the world 
economy” and serve as a middle area which can “partially deflect the political pressures 
which groups primarily located in the periphery might otherwise direct against core-
states and the groups which operate within and through their state machinery” 
(Wallerstein, 1974: 231). The semi-peripheral areas are intermediaries between the 
elites of the core and the inexpensive production of the periphery. They absorb some of 
the capital flowing through them due to their better position in the hierarchy, but still do 
not accumulate to the same proportion as those at the top of the structure. In fact, there 
is a reification which keeps the structure in place. The world economy regulates itself by 
expanding the economic and social gaps between different areas as the system 
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develops further and the “tasks requiring higher levels of skill and capitalization are 
reserved for higher ranking areas” (Wallerstein, 1974: 231). This bolsters the existing 
structures and “the forces of the marketplace reinforce rather than undermine them” 
(Wallerstein, 1974: 231). There is in place a tipping point, where the strength of a state 
creates more strength; alternatively, the opposite is also true, where the weakness of a 
state leads to more weakness. 
Wallerstein‟s articulation of World System Theory has been challenged for being unable 
to explain contemporary changes. (see Agnew, 1982; Germain and Kenney, 1998) 
However, he has updated and re-interpreted his earlier notions. The more current 
writings abandon some of the orthodoxy of the earlier iterations, but they do not entirely 
deviate from the original model. The notion of the World System has not been 
consigned to history, rather, it remains relevant today as, “the world-system is not only 
polarized but polarizing, and […] this reality is both morally and politically intolerable” 
(Wallerstein, 2004: 2). His methodology remains, viewing development in that system 
through a historical perspective, where, in the world system “over five hundred years of 
its existence, the gap between the top and the bottom, the core and the periphery, has 
never gotten smaller, always larger.” (Wallerstein, 2004: 4) This does not blunt his 
advocacy or conviction the that system is dysfunctional and bound to fail, much in the 
same way that Marx did not waver in this determination. 
Wallerstein allows that the World System is not static, and that “there is no question that 
some countries have improved their relative standing in the distribution of wealth in the 
world-system.” (Wallerstein, 2004: 4) This can account for the so-called „Asian Miracle‟ 
which consisted of “[t]he rise of Japan in the 1960s followed by South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Hong Kong in the 1970s and then the rapid growth of China after 1980 
later accompanied by industrialization spurts in Indonesia, India, Vietnam, Thailand and 
Malaysia during the 1990s” (Harvey, 2009a). This “altered the center of gravity of 
capitalist development”, even though much of these gains were reduced during the East 
Asian financial crisis of 1997 through 1998 which briefly, but significantly, reversed the 
flow of wealth towards the core (Harvey, 2009). These events do not deviate from his 
admission that it is possible for “a few countries mov[e] from one category to another” 
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(Wallerstein, 2004: 4). Wallerstein also makes a salient observation about the Asian 
success and that given the present dysfunction of Western organisation, it provides an 
opportunity to challenge the hegemon. Additionally, he mentions the fact that Japan has 
created the fastest computer in the world, surpassing the speed of the best US 
computer by twenty times. (Wallerstein, 2002: 60) The significance of this is twofold. 
One reason is that it clearly demonstrates that the US does not have a stranglehold on 
technological completion on the global scene. Rather, it is far from it. The second 
importance is the purpose of the machine. While the best US computers are reserved 
for weapons simulations, the Japanese computer is intended to simulate climate 
change. “This contrast embodies the oldest story in the history of hegemonic powers. 
The dominant power concentrates (to its detriment) on the military; the candidate for 
successor concentrates on the economy. The latter has always paid off, handsomely” 
(Wallerstein, 2002: 67). He goes on to posit that if the US falters, then perhaps a 
Chinese-Japanese nexus could supplant it as global hegemon. The acknowledgement 
of the ability to transition from different parts of the global hierarchy reduces the rigidity 
of Wallerstein‟s original theories and can account for events such as the „Asian miracle‟. 
2.6 Antonio Gramsci – The Prison Notebooks 
Gramsci, while languishing in a prison in fascist Italy, also made significant contributions 
to the field of historical materialism. He attributed the socialist revolution‟s failure in 
Western Europe, despite success in Russia, to hegemony. (Hobden and Wyn Jones, 
2001: 2010). Hegemony is a more subtle way of preserving power than many realist 
notions, in which the strong maintain their positions in an anarchic world through their 
material capabilities (see Waltz, 1986). In Gramsci‟s estimation, maintenance of power 
depends upon a more nuanced approach. A hegemon uses both coercion and consent 
to influence individuals and society. This harks back to earlier writings by another 
Italian, Niccolo Machiavelli. He believed that a prince could learn from the centaur, a 
creature which is half man and half beast, and that “it is necessary for a prince to know 
how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other is not durable” 
(Machiavelli, 1988: 61). Like the centaur, a hegemon makes use of two different tactics, 
coercion, through force, and consent. The latter exercise of power “does not need a 
barking voice, [it] strangles you with silk ribbons, charm and intelligence (Zizek, 2009, 
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50). This analysis differs from the ideas of Marx and Engels, who focused on the 
coercion and fear “that kept the alienated majority from rising up and overthrowing the 
system that was the cause of their suffering” (Hobden and Wyn Jones, 2001: 210). This 
explains why the revolution was able to succeed in Russia, a state with a more primitive 
organisation of rule, and therefore relying more heavily on coercion than consent. In 
Western Europe, on the other hand, the exercise of power balanced force with consent, 
undermining attempts at revolution. Hegemony adds a valuable dimension to the class- 
and economically-based analysis of historical materialism. 
The creation of this consent is an ongoing process which is perpetuated and constantly 
recast by the hegemon, or those who rule a society (Hobden and Wyn Jones, 2001: 
210). This is accomplished by aligning the interests and values of the subordinate 
classes with those of the hegemon, until they are seen as unquestionable or „common 
sense‟. Examples would be religion and the aristocracy‟s similar interests in pre-
revolutionary France or the questionable logic of consumerism which is pervasive today. 
Through the establishment of a historic bloc, a hegemon manages the “mutually 
reinforcing and reciprocal relationships between the socioeconomic relations (base) and 
political and cultural practices (superstructure) that together underpin a given order” 
(Hobden and Wyn Jones, 2001: 211). This broadened interpretation of original Marxist 
thought again suggests that evaluating society based solely on material capabilities of 
the exercise of power or economic factors is too narrow a focus. It is the interaction 
between politics, economics and ideas which is most crucial. Gramsci also speaks to 
the notion of transformismo, whereby the leadership of a society co-opt and recruit the 
leadership of potential counter-movements into their programme, thereby neutralising, 
or at least weakening, the strength and coherence of potential opposition. (Gramsci, 
1971: 580) The “rule of dominant classes is legitimised through the acquisition of the 
consent of subordinate classes” (Leysens, 2012: 10). This is done through the 
extension of concessions to subordinate classes and ensuring that the interests of the 
same classes are, to an extent, accommodated (Leysens, 2012: 10).  
The last contribution of Gramsci to be discussed is the notion of how a hegemonic 
authority can be challenged. Such a challenge could result in a transformation or the 
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supplanting of one hegemon by another. If a hegemon loses legitimacy, if it fails to 
control society by manufacturing consent and must rely more on naked force, this 
allows the opportunity for a counter-hegemonic movement to arise. If this counter-
movement can gather enough strength, it can construct a historic bloc of its own, and 
thus change the order and become the hegemon and create society in the manner 
which it desires. 
2.7 Robert W. Cox – World Order Approach 
Robert Cox‟s analysis followed the Gramscian tradition, while also relying on a 
structuralist framework akin to World System Theory. He wrote of the power and role of 
a hegemon, which constrain actions which are possible in society and those which are 
not. Using a reference from Marx, he states that, “[m]en make history […] but not in 
conditions of their own choosing” (Cox, 1987: 241; cf. Marx, 1919). Therefore, to be 
able to “have any influence over events, or at least to forestall the worst eventualities”, 
one must understand the structures within which one is situated and understand which 
actions they permit” (Cox, 1987: 241). His goal “is to find the connections between the 
mental schema through which people conceive action and the material world which 
constrains both what people can do and how they can think about doing it.” (Cox, 1996: 
95) Along with this, he includes an important note on theories and ideas. “Theory is 
always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox, 1986: 128; author‟s emphasis). Thus, 
when analysing a theory, one must be cognizant of the structures within which it is 
created. Theory cannot be value free; it is always a product of a certain set of 
conditions. “Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social 
time and space” (Cox, 1987: 207). This can be easily seen through a few salient 
examples. Clearly, the writings which Antonio Gramsci produced were influenced by his 
incarceration. Another notable, and not dissimilar, example is Sayyid Qutb, whose 
writing from Nasser‟s prison in Egypt would inspire the Muslim Brotherhood. If any 
political theory purports to be immutable and universal, it is blatantly false. In this 
manner, theory cannot be ahistorical nor based solely upon “theory but rather on 
changing practice and empirical-historical study, which are a proving ground for 
concepts and hypotheses” (Cox, 1987: 206-207). 
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Cox applies Gramsci‟s idea of hegemony, which in The Prison Notebooks focusses on a 
domestic or state level, to the international level. A hegemon also exists across the 
world and the way in which it shapes, and in turn is shaped by actors, is just as 
important. Echoing the World System theorists, he finds that historical materialism 
includes “a vertical dimension of power [which] is the dominance and subordination of 
metropole over hinterland, center over periphery, in a world political economy” (Cox, 
1987: 215-216). Within this, the world must be regarded “from a standpoint definable in 
terms of nation or social class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining 
power, of a sense of immobility or of present crisis, of past experience, and of hopes 
and expectations for the future” (Cox, 1987: 207; author‟s emphasis). Similar to Gramsci 
and Marx, Cox believes that this order is neither natural nor eternal. Rather, with a 
proper understanding of the structure of the world order and appropriate action, change 
can be enacted. “To change the world we have to begin with an understanding of the 
world as it is, which means the structures of reality that surround us” (Cox, 1987: 242). 
One must be aware of these structures. They can be accepted or resisted; however, 
they cannot be ignored. “To the extent that they do successfully resist a prevailing 
historical structure, they buttress their actions with an alternative, emerging 
configuration of forces” (Cox, 1987: 217-218). An understanding of these systems “may 
be aided by an understanding of how structural transformations have come about in the 
past” (Cox, 1987: 244). Through the conflict between the hegemon and the emerging 
configuration of forces, there is “a continual remaking of human nature and the creation 
of new patterns of social relations which change the rules of the game (Cox, 1987: 215). 
A historical materialist will see this “conflict as a possible cause of structural change” 
(Cox, 1987: 215). Cox also writes of movements, which he termed civil society, which 
constitute “a mobilized participant citizenry juxtaposed to dominant economic and state 
power” Cox and Schechter, 2002: 99). These voluntary associations provide a 
challenge to the existing power relations. It is “the realm in which cultural change takes 
place, in which the counter-hegemony of emancipatory forces can be constituted” (Cox 
and Schechter, 2002: 102). These movements have attracted much attention in the 
wake of the financial crisis. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 30 
 
Cox views “social relations as the foundations of political authorities and the origins of 
conflicts” (Cox and Schechter, 2002: 80). These relations are organised around 
production, which “creates the material basis for all forms of social existence, and the 
ways in which human efforts are combined in productive processes affect all other 
aspects of social life, including the polity” (Cox, 1987: 1). Through the production 
process, historical structures are formed, meaning “persistent social practices, made by 
collective human activity and transformed through collective human activity” (Cox, 1987: 
4). Yet, within this organisation, there are dominant and subordinate groups, where [t]he 
dominant group controls production; the subordinate works under its control” (Cox, 
1987: 17). He makes a particular distinction to the situation in the African context, which 
will become relevant in Chapter 4 of this study. He finds that, in the African context, 
there exist “extreme cases of state breakdown and of alienation of people from the 
state” (Cox, 2002: 113). In sum, “political struggle for control of the state [is] thus a 
struggle for a share of the economic product of the country, a product divided between 
foreign investors and the power holders in a state” (Cox, 2002: 113). The links between 
the state and foreign capital have resulted in a widespread distrust of state institutions 
and a reliance on self-help communities; this constitutes “a form of incipient civil society 
which has turned its back on the state” (Cox, 2002: 114). Yet, Cox is uncertain as to the 
potential of these movements to catalyse a transformational change. Indeed, 
“developing states are inclined to reflect the dynamics associated with passive 
revolution although they do attempt to follow the hegemonic „model‟ exported by 
dominant states” (Leysens, 2008: 83). 
Cox also refers to Gramsci‟s notions of consciousness, the lowest form of which would 
be corporative consciousness, which pertained to “the collective self-interest of a 
particular group” (Cox, 1999:15). He also spoke of class consciousness, which 
incorporates and unifies elements of corporative consciousness. Lastly was hegemonic 
consciousness, which transcends class consciousness “by incorporating interests of the 
„non-fundamental” social groups into a vision of society based on one of the 
„fundamental‟ classes; and it would make this vision appear as the „natural order‟ of 
society” (Cox, 1999: 16). Cox highlights two other Gramscian contributions, both of 
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which will be revisited in Chapter 4; namely, the notion of a war of position, and a 
passive revolution. The war of position, “a strategy for the long-term construction of self-
conscious groups into a concerted emancipatory bloc” (Cox, 1999: 16), is contrasted 
with a war of manoeuvre, where seizing power may be done prior to the construction of 
a coherent organisation. The war of manoeuvre is more precarious that a war of 
position, as the latter has unified enough social forces in order to challenge and replace 
the existing authority. The second term is a passive revolution, which “represents an 
abortive or incomplete transformation of society” (Cox, 1999: 16). Transformismo, which 
is “a strategy on the part of the dominant power gradually to coopt elements of the 
opposition forces”, represents one form of a passive revolution. (Cox, 1999: 16) Another 
is the revolution/restoration where a group cannot overcome the entrenched dominant 
forces, leading to a stalemate of sorts (Cox, 1999: 16). These concepts prove relevant 
when analysing the case in Chapter 4. 
Cox is not without his detractors (see Schechter, 2002: Chapter 1). One reason for this 
is that his approach does not “understand social interaction and political change as 
challenging and redefining the limits of the „possible‟.” (Germain and Kenney, 1998: 10) 
“Cox‟s reductionist, objectivist historical materialism […] has no place for a dynamic, 
neccessitarian, antithetical route to emancipation.” (Spegele, 1997: 222) Spegele 
searches for the evidence of the emergence of a counter hegemonic order advanced by 
Cox‟s writings and cannot find one; “reflection alone suffices to generate dialectical, 
antagonistic movement in the world order.” (Spegele, 1997: 224) His advocacy of “an 
awareness of the present social divisions generated in the production process, of the 
conditions of existence of these various groups and their modes of perceiving the world, 
and of their potential directions of movement” also garners criticism (Cox, 1987: 403). 
Spegele believes that “[i]dentifying economic and social contradictions is of dubious 
benefit if it does not at the same time create motivational energies to change them” and 
that Cox, simply wishes to make people “„aware‟ of what the world is like, providing 
them with reasons and „hoping‟ they will act upon them rather than, for example, 
transforming their self-understandings so that they will act to eradicate their suffering.” 
(Spegele, 1997: 224) The criticisms are not unwarranted; however, the framework used 
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by Cox proves useful for understanding the dynamics of the modern world, and, many 
continued to employ aspects of it, whether knowingly or not, in later analyses.  
2.8 Contemporary Theoretical Responses to the Crisis 
The economic crisis has inspired a plethora of writing from critical academic circles. 
They are characterised by their diversity in addressing the challenges and opportunities 
which arise from the ongoing events. Some follow the orthodox tradition of Marx. They 
claim that economics is the key driver of the situation and this is ultimately what will lead 
to a resolution or transformation. Others address the crisis as a matter of world order 
and follow the structuralist argument of World Systems Theory. This is often combined 
with the notion that the crisis signals an end to hegemony, which incorporates the 
traditions of Gramsci. Another group looks toward the widespread protest and social 
movements as the key to emancipation. Most critical attempts to understand and solve 
the crisis cannot be so clearly delineated into one of these categories. Also, of course, 
the different theoretical approaches are characterised more by their dissonance rather 
than their coherence. The inability to form a unified alternative is a weakness, perhaps a 
fatal one. Yet, within these approaches, there could exist a possible avenue forward, 
toward a future reconciliation. They are thus worthy of an examination in order to 
understand the possible theoretical approaches towards emancipation, which will be 
explored in the following paragraphs. 
Burnham advocates a return to an earlier interpretation of Marx. He rejects “modern 
[International Political Economy]‟s unsatisfactory eclectic mixture of analytic methods 
and theoretical perspectives.” (Burnham, 1994: 222) The tendency to frame the analysis 
of the global economic order through the approaches must be reversed as “[t]he most 
powerful alternative is not to be found in extrapolating from the work of Polanyi, 
Schumpeter, Gramsci or Lenin” (Burnham, 1994: 222). His “Open Marxism” is based 
upon three core principles, the centrality of class struggle, a use of form-analysis 
instead of determinism, and an absolute rejection of fetishism (Burnham, 1994: 224-
226). Commodity fetishism  can be seen to exist “in the social activity of human beings 
taking the form of relations between things (McNally, 1981: 46). Burnham sees the 
crisis, and indeed all economic crises, as “an aspect of the constitution of capital (a 
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social relation based on class exploitation) and the process of the accumulation of 
capital itself that produce the characteristic expressions of crisis in terms of 
overproduction, under-consumption and disproportionality” (Burnham, 2010: 28) The 
key to understanding the current global crisis lies in the “growing and chronic separation 
between money capital and productive capital (or between financial and productive 
accumulation)” (Burnham, 2010: 34) Credit, a major driver of the crisis, “is also the 
principal lever of overproduction and excessive speculation in commerce and, as such, 
accelerates violent outbreaks of crisis” (Burnham, 2010; 35; cf. Marx, 1981) This credit 
serves to mask the contradictions of capital accumulation as it can, for a time, sustain 
consumption when the market has moved from equilibrium. The economic system and 
class relations which caused the crisis show little sign of any major adjustment, yet they 
remain transitory. (Burnham, 2010: 37) 
Samir Amin also puts forth an argument which is similar to Marx‟s original tradition. 
Contemporary capitalism is characterised by oligopolies. These oligopolies consist of 
those who have access to financial and capital markets. Thus they are not terribly 
different from the bourgeoisie depicted in Marx‟s writings. In fact, they represent “a 
transformation of the ruling bourgeois class which has become a rent-capturing 
plutocracy.” (Amin, 2010: 264) Many contemporary voices portrayed as critical are 
anything but. Amin launches a particular attack towards Joseph Stiglitz, who “remains 
convinced that the system as it stands – globalised and financialised liberalism – can be 
fixed by means of some corrections” and Amartya Sen, who “preaches morality without 
daring to think of „really existing‟ capitalism as it necessarily is. (Amin, 2010: 267) Amin 
is joined by David Harvey, who finds that governments have “protected the banks and 
destroyed the people” (Harvey, 2009) He sees the money transferred through the 
government bailouts as being incorrectly spent. Instead of supporting domestic 
constituencies, resources are directed towards the capitalist class and the banks, which 
in turn use “the money not to lend to anybody but to buy other banks. They are 
consolidating their class power” (Harvey, 2009). Therefore, the question must be 
whether the survival of banking institutions is more important than the survival of 
individuals and societies.  
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Other writers focus on the global divide between the rich and the poor. As the top strata, 
the billionaires of the world, increase their capture of capital, they distance themselves 
from the middle class. The middle class, typically educated or trained workers, is also 
distant from the global agrarian class. These are the individuals who grow, produce, and 
harvest resources for the benefits of the higher classes. This analysis does not mention 
the legions of unemployed throughout the world. But the disparities between these 
groups grow, and they become more rigidly enforced and defined. Unless a more 
equitable world is formed, with a decrease in the worth of the capitalist class and an 
increase in the redistribution to lower classes, “injustice, dangers and instability” will 
abide in the world. (Pope, 2011) These writers focus their critique towards the dynamics 
of class and economic struggle. The ideas of Marx are not far from this method, even 
though they have been reinterpreted in current times.  
The crisis has also prompted a re-evaluation of the World Systems Theory. Wallerstein 
has contributed to this approach since the advent of the crisis. His main assertion is that 
the system “has moved too far from equilibrium, such that it is today in structural crisis.” 
(Wallerstein, 2011) Costs of production have risen so far that they have constrained the 
ability for profit accumulation. (Wallerstein, 2011) Rather than struggling to save a 
system which is in decline, he believes that the focus should be towards the future and 
whether what comes next will be “a new system that replicates some of the present 
system‟s essential features of hierarchy and polarization […] one that is relatively 
democratic and egalitarian” (Wallerstein, 2011) Amin has also regarded the 
ramifications of the crisis through the perspective of the World System. The contrast 
between accumulation at the core and the periphery is what drives the crisis and the 
opportunity for change. This has the result of enriching certain privileged groups while 
dispossessing those residing in the peripheries. (Amin, 2010: 262) He agrees that the 
capitalist centres in the North will try to hold power and transform the system to their 
advantage. The only way to successfully challenge this system and to transform it to a 
more exclusive one would be through an alliance between disenfranchised groups in 
the North with those in the South. Such an alliance is uncertain to occur, but, if it did, it 
could result in “an exit from capitalism” (Amin, 2010: 271). 
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Intimately linked to the transformation of the World System are the notions that the crisis 
will cause the end of US hegemony, which would result in a dramatic transformation of 
the global economic order. This perspective is based upon the observation that “[t]he 
US economy appears to be in terminal decline” (Todhunter, 2012) There is a “drift of 
wealth from West to East in the global economy [which] rapidly alter[s] the balance of 
hegemonic economic power” (Harvey, 2009a) This change provides opportunities for 
the global South, who should take the opportunity to argue for “a negotiated 
globalisation without hegemonies” (Amin, 2010: 272). However, the end of hegemony is 
not so simple. There still exists the “unpredictable political and economic ramifications in 
a world where the United States will no longer be in a dominant position even as it 
possesses significant power” (Harvey, 2009a). There is little as dangerous as “an 
empire in decline armed to the teeth with both conventional and nuclear weapons” 
(Todhunter, 2012). Increasing confrontation, and decreasing success, leaves the 
hegemon “trapped in a cycle of endless war in what must surely be a futile attempt to 
stave off ruin” (Todhunter, 2012). While the crisis may result in the end of the US 
hegemony, it is likely that if this occurs it will be characterised by desperation on the 
part of the hegemon as it violently attempts to cling to its empire. 
Other writers situate the most important locus of the current events with the emerging 
protest movements. This is similar to Cox‟s notion of a “real opposition [which] seemed 
to be outside of the political system”, as well as Gill‟s description of the movements 
containing “innovative conceptions of social justice and solidarity, of social possibility, of 
knowledge, emancipation, and freedom” (Gill, 2000: 140). Protests are currently 
occurring throughout the world, and their physical manifestations will be revisited in 
Chapter 4. They are generally locally driven and “each of the local movements finds 
itself locked into the fight of its life with its own national governments” (Jones, 2012) The 
international, yet disconnected, nature of these movements means “the tempo of 
struggle in each country is different: the defeats and victories, retreats and advances 
cannot be measured on an international terrain so easily – though it is certainly the case 
that a victory or defeat in any one country will be keenly felt by those involved overseas” 
(Jones, 2012). One common characteristic of many of these protests is the feature of 
disenfranchised youth (Callenicos, 2012: 4; Harvey, 2009). For the movements to be 
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successful, a necessity for their anarchic elements is to connect with better organised 
movements, such as labour. (Harvey, 2009) “Only where they have fused with mass 
protest by organized workers‟ movements have youth uprisings been capable of 
overturning governments and transforming the political terrain” (McNally, 2012: 51). This 
can give them a serious advantage; the “economic clout of workers‟ struggles, which 
can shut off the flow of business profits” (McNally, 2012: 51). Despite perhaps some 
incremental and local success, without a coherent organisation they remain doomed to 
irrelevancy on a global, systematic, level.  
Some approaches have interpreted the current moment as a conflict of ideas. 
Consciousness is “not a direct derivative of class; it [is] a historical construction, not an 
automatically determined condition” (Cox and Schechter, 2002: 104). Broadly 
disseminating this consciousness is instrumental to a hegemon. (Gramsci, 1971) 
Recently, the prevalent consensus has been, for many, driven by western ideals of 
liberalism and consumption. The modern hegemon encourages “a systematic de-
politicisation, [which] has given rise to a new political culture of „consensus‟ (modelled 
on the example of the USA) which substitutes the consumer and the political spectator 
for the active citizen” (Amin, 2010: 270). It “has sought to eliminate the very category of 
value in the ethical sense. Over the past 30 years, capitalist realism has successfully 
installed a “business ontology” in which it is simply obvious that everything in society, 
including healthcare and education, should be run as a business.” (Jones, 2012: 7) 
Capitalism “does not require disenchantment and revolutionary murmurs, but 
acquiescence and passivity from a population that is distracted by infotainment and the 
advertising industry and its products and looks to its leaders to save it from their fears 
and confusions” (Todhunter, 2012).  
However, the crisis has done much to dispel, or at least tarnish, these ideals 
propagated by the hegemon. In the North, it has demonstrated that the concepts 
underlying liberal democracy are hollow. “This regression is masked by the pretensions 
of the so-called „post-modern‟ discourse, according to which nations and classes have 
already left the scene and ceded the political space to the „individual‟ which is now the 
active subject of social transformation” (Amin, 2010: 270). The illusions spread in the 
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South are of a different nature. They constitute “a capitalist, national and autonomous 
development that is part of globalisation, which is powerful among the dominant and the 
middles classes in „emergent markets‟, fuelled by the immediate success of the last few 
decades” (Amin, 2010: 270). Yet, even though some of the myths have been 
discredited, alternatives, “despite their visible growth, remain as a whole unable to 
question the social order linked to the capitalism” (Amin, 2010: 270). 
The contemporary responses to the crisis provide useful analytical tools. However, they 
are not without their flaws. Burnham‟s Open Marxism conceptualises the economic 
elements of the contradictions associated with capital. However, his work is silent with 
regard to the ways in which the propagation of this system occurs and how, beyond the 
sheer economic impact, they are undermined by the crisis as well. This criticism can be 
levelled at others who approach the events from a primarily structuralist perspective as 
well. This fault has been addressed, in a sense, by the writers who have taken a 
perspective of the financial crisis leading to a concomitant crisis in hegemonic 
legitimacy, and who see various counter movements exemplifying this. The 
contemporary theoretical approaches could indeed be classified as such themselves as 
the financial crisis has provided the space for an articulation of alternative perspectives. 
Broadly, they can be criticised on two fronts. The first, and most important, if a real 
counter hegemonic alternative is to be presented, is the ideological disarray which is 
characteristic of the modern Left. These examples prove no exception to this. They offer 
useful insights but do not contribute to coherent holistic movement which can challenge 
the hegemonic order. A scattered outburst of indignant voices will not achieve an 
emancipatory change. The second general flaw is inherent to much critical academic 
reflection. It has been mentioned earlier when discussing Spegele‟s criticisms of Robert 
Cox, namely, that critical reflections on world order are insufficient and must be 
grounded in practical mobilisation. Until a more coherent approach can be constituted, 
as well as connected with physical manifestations of dissatisfaction outside academia, it 
would seem unlikely that the hegemonic order, despite its weakness, can be challenged 
by an emancipatory project. 
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2.9 Conclusion 
The ongoing economic crisis has brought the need for a critical review of the 
assumptions which underpin the global order. The exposure of the doctrine 
underpinning capitalism for what it truly is - large scale accumulation for a small class, 
and dispossession of the rest - has brought about a crisis in the legitimacy of the 
system. The deviation from the underlying principles of the system effectively “mean the 
end of liberal capitalism” (Habermas, 1973; 645). Liberal capitalism can be seen as the 
ideology which has driven the hegemonic project, with the free market as an effective 
synonym. The financial crisis, and the policy responses which followed it, have 
demonstrated the weakness of these doctrines. The practical implications of the 
financial crisis will be discussed in the following chapters. Many theoretical approaches 
can be taken to understand the causes, ramifications and opportunities surrounding the 
crisis. However, the most effective is through a combination of Marxist analyses, which 
can articulate the contradictions of the system and the recurrence of crises. Therefore, a 
synthesis of these approaches provides the framework of a World System, with, at its 
apex, a hegemon, whose constituent, global, managerial class shapes the structures of 
the contemporary world order. Within this, in Chapter 4, Cox‟s notion that social forces 
as the basis of political authority and the locus of conflict will be used to understand the 
decreasing legitimacy of the hegemonic project by its subordinate constituents and the 
likelihood of this producing a transformative change in the examined society. This will 
be done in light of the financial crisis, a moment which precipitated the ongoing global 
economic malaise, and is situated in a broader crisis of capitalism, where the principles 
underlying the global capitalist system have failed to bring peace, prosperity, and 
stability for many throughout the world.  
To understand the economic and class based aspects of the crisis, Marx is the proper 
place to commence. The structuralist approach of World Systems Theory provides an 
opportunity to understand the global economic order and the hierarchy within that, 
especially if one uses the notion as a conceptual framework, rather than a rigid 
dogmatic methodology. Gramsci and the neo-Gramscian theories also provide the 
notion of hegemony which adapts well to the World Systems approach. Marxist theory 
has also given rise to a countless variety of interpretations. Following the financial crisis, 
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these ideas proliferated. They are thematically diverse. Many, however, echo the 
arguments of traditional Marxism, World Systems Theory, and the Gramscian approach. 
This is a testament to the value of the original theoretical contributions - seeing the 
economic crisis as a challenge to the legitimacy of the hegemonic World System. With 
the theoretical understanding of the structures which characterise a hegemon, and the 
methods through which their influence is exerted, namely through the balance of 
coercion and consent, it may be possible to see how a hegemonic order can be 
challenged. The financial crisis, which was generated largely in the Wall Street – City of 
London nexus, is merely a symptom of a much broader decline; that of the crisis of the 
liberal capitalist world model, the latest iteration of which is based, primarily, upon the 
model of US and UK. Indeed, “[t]he global financial crisis has created a vacuum, a 
period of uncertainty, where the confidence in an economic idea (presented as the 
natural state of affairs) has been severely damaged” (Leysens, 2012: 9). The lack of 
legitimacy of this system, in the face of growing inequality and the financial crisis, erode 
the foundation upon which it is built. This contributes to a concomitant decline in the 
manner through which the hegemonic project can exert control through the exercise of 
consent. Following Gramsci, and recognising that there is no clear counter-movement, 
this would lead one to suspect that, as consent amongst the populace declines, the 
coercive nature of control may become ever more prevalent.  
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Chapter 3 - Evolution of the Global Economic Order 
 
“Banking was conceived in iniquity and was born in sin. The bankers own 
 the earth. Take it away from them, but leave them the power to create 
 money, and with the flick of the pen they will create enough deposits to 
 buy it back again. However, take it away from them, and all the great 
 fortunes like mine will disappear and they ought to disappear, for this 
 would be a happier and better world to live in. But, if you wish to remain 
 the slaves of bankers and pay the cost of your own slavery, let them 
 continue to create money”        
 Josiah Stamp, formerly a director of the Bank of England, and reputedly 
 the second richest man in England; cited in Fine (2008; 1). 
 
“Why do we remember the past, and not the future?” 
Stephen Hawking, cited in Atwood (1990: 2) 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The capitalist system is based upon “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1942). One 
element of this destruction is the “smashing up of social structures in order to extract the 
element of labor from them” (Polanyi, 1944: 164). Once the structures have vanished, 
capital can reorganise, or disfigure, society through the framework of commodification. 
This forms a society where “Hobbes‟ grotesque vision of the state – a human Leviathan 
whose vast body [is] made up of an infinite number of human bodies – [is] dwarfed by 
the Ricardian construct of a labor market: a flow of human lives the supply of which [is] 
regulated by the amount of food put at their disposal” (Polanyi, 1944: 164). The system 
has evolved over a long period of time and its current iteration is pervasive global 
capitalism, led by the international managerial class centred in the United States (US). 
However, in “all likelihood [their] neo-conservative bid for global supremacy will go down 
in history as one of the several „bubbles‟ that punctuated the terminal crisis of US 
hegemony” (Arrighi, 2005: 1). 
To understand the current dynamics of the economic system, one must examine it from 
a historical perspective, with a particular focus on the processes which shaped the 
current world order. Although the chapter will focus mainly on economic relations, it will 
begin by noting the connection between military dominance and hegemony. It will 
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demonstrate that a hegemonic project cannot dominate the World System, and 
therefore shape its structures, without the military capabilities to explicitly, and implicitly, 
guarantee that order. It will next explore the genesis of the current world economy 
based upon capital. This will be followed by the counter-movement following the Second 
World War which resulted in the emergence of Keynesianism and the Bretton Woods 
institutions, and then the neo-liberal shift which occurred during the Thatcher and 
Reagan administrations. The near-absolute liberalisation of the 1990s will follow. This 
examination will bring us to the present, where phenomena such as growing inequality 
and a global economic system in a continuing and worsening crisis, can be attributed to 
the evolution of the capitalist system. 
3.2 Historical origins of the capitalist system 
The notion of hegemony will be explored in the following sections. However, before that 
is done, one point must be acknowledged and briefly examined. “The hidden hand of 
the market will never work without a hidden fist. McDonald's cannot flourish without 
McDonnell Douglas.... And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's 
technologies to flourish is called the US Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps” 
(Roy, 2002; cf. Friedman, 2000). The following short section will examine the military 
dominance of the global hegemon and the ability to control and shape world markets 
which stems from this. Market enthusiasts may argue that if left to its‟ own devices 
humankind would organize itself along the lines of a market based society and it is 
simply the state and intervention which denies this perfect equilibrium or utopia. (Louw, 
2012) The notion is false because the progress towards the market-based society has 
been neither free nor natural. Rather it has been imposed, frequently through violent 
coercion. The history of economic progress shows that “the emergence of national 
markets was in no way the result of the gradual and spontaneous emancipation of the 
economic sphere from governmental control” (Polanyi, 1944: 250).  
The globally integrated market is one of the most pervasive structures in the modern 
world. Globalisation is generally understood as referring to a spatial expansion of trade, 
communication, investment and migration. However, there is much more to the process. 
It also means the globalisation of a hegemonic ideological model; one which takes 
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precedence in areas “of development, of political concepts and standards of global 
governance, of rules, norms, and a global language” (Altvater, 2009: 74). Another 
understanding of globalisation is the “existence of relations between different regions of 
the world” (Amin and Luckin, 1996: 231). The beginning of this process between 
previously geographically isolated actors signals the birth of a globalised, rather than a 
regionalised or localised, world. Amin suggests that this process of interaction and 
interpretation commenced with the “ancient world system”, from 500 BC to 1500 AD, 
between China, India, and the Middle East (Amin and Luckin, 1996: 231). The 
organization was not capitalist and instead based on a tributary structure. This system 
generally characterised both the core states and their peripheries, the latter group 
including Europe, Africa, and Southeast Asia (Amin, 1992). 
The organisation of this system changed with the advent of capitalism, as Europe 
replaced the other centres as the singular core (Amin and Luckin, 1996: 231). Europe 
became the core; however, neither the region, nor any state within it, could be 
considered a hegemon until a later period. The first leaders were the Italian cities, 
followed by the United Provinces, and then Great Britain (Wallerstein, 2000: 95). Each 
of the hegemons controlled the continental banking sector at their prime. Genoa 
financed Spain‟s conquest of the Americas and made a significant profit in return. 
Amsterdam was important as was Britain, centred on London, for a certain period. In 
terms of financialisation, Arrighi refers to Braudel‟s analysis, that  
“in the past-in say Genoa or Amsterdam-following a wave of growth in 
 commercial capitalism and the accumulation of capital on a scale beyond 
 the normal channels for investment, finance capitalism was already in a 
 position to take over and dominate, for a while at least, all the activities of 
 the business world” (Arrighi, 2005: 2 cf. Braudel, 1984).  
In every case, perhaps including the current US dominated global system, the end of a 
hegemonic period is preceded “by reaching the stage of financial expansion” (Arrighi, 
2005: 2; cf. Braudel, 1984). 
 This is a marker of a hegemon‟s maturity and it is “a sign of autumn” (Arrighi, 2005: 2; 
cf. Braudel, 1984). 
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Rather than simple conflicts or processes, Polanyi takes a broad view of what caused 
the significant power shifts in the early decades of the 1900s which would lead to a 
change in hegemon. It was not, as in ancient Rome the “external or internal attack of 
barbarians; its vitality was not sapped by the devastations of World War I nor by the 
revolt of a socialist proletariat nor a fascist lower middle class” (Polanyi, 1944: 249). Nor 
was it adherence to an economic doctrine which engendered a failure due to 
underconsumption or overproduction. Rather, it was the measures which were enacted 
to protect individuals from the ruthless self-regulating market. This “conflict between the 
market and the elementary requirements of an organized social life provided the century 
with its dynamics and produced the typical strains and stresses which ultimately 
destroyed that society” (Polanyi, 1944: 249). The wars and conflict which this provoked 
simply served to hasten its destruction. The conscious and violent government 
intervention to impose the self-regulating market organisation had resulted in “the 
congenital weakness of the nineteenth century society” (Polanyi, 1944: 250). 
3.2.1 Counter-movement – Keynesianism, state-led growth 
The failure of the financial system, represented most clearly by Black Friday in 1929, 
between the two World Wars, caused a swath of destruction. “The Great Depression of 
the 1930s was the worst and most politically dangerous in the history of capitalism. It 
threatened to reverse the historic pattern of capitalist development” (Genovese, 1995). 
The military conflicts which this crisis precipitated prompted a critical examination of the 
framework which had allowed such events to occur. This evaluation revealed a strong 
counter-movement. This movement attempted to alter the system in order to prevent the 
widespread fallout from occurring again. The critical evaluation culminated in, and the 
counter-movement was institutionalized at, the Bretton Woods Conference 1944. Here, 
financial architects rejected the dogma of a purely free market and instead opted for 
interventionist policies constructed upon “an international economic order that 
legitimized them within an international framework of rules” (Helleiner, 1995: 151). 
Central in the new economic order aiming for stability was the Keynesian welfare state.  
The results of the conference signalled a dramatic reversal of the norms which had 
previously prevailed. Under the new Bretton Woods system finance was no longer the 
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master but became a servant, subordinate in a socially embedded order which 
promised more stability. Controls introduced on capital would “help to minimize the 
socially disruptive influence of speculative and „disequilibrating‟ capital movements on 
exchange rates and trading patterns” (Helleiner, 1995: 152). The capital controls were 
also intended to protect and promote the autonomy of the state; the defender of stability 
against the vagaries of the self-regulated market. Without these, “it would be difficult to 
pursue the kind of independent macroeconomic programs, tax policies and financial 
regulatory initiatives that were expected of the postwar Keynesian welfare state” 
(Helleiner, 1995, 152). The primacy of states, and their legitimacy, was integral to the 
counter-movement against the unfettered market. The designers of the Bretton Woods 
system “sought to prevent the policy agenda of democratic governments from being 
thwarted by capital flight motivated by „political reasons‟ or a desire to evade the burden 
of social legislation” (Helleiner, 1995: 152). The lead American negotiator, Harry Dexter 
White, argued that finance must be prohibited from operating “against what the 
government deemed to be the interests of any country” (Helleiner, 1995: 152). Despite 
the best of intentions, and a seemingly strong regime, the Bretton Woods system, while 
operating successfully for a number of decades, was eventually perverted. It became a 
construct which Keynes and similar thinkers would likely find abhorrent; finance 
regained its dominant position; states and governments found themselves powerless at 
the hands of the market; capital flight occurred for reasons political and otherwise -- in a 
matter of minutes or seconds -- social, labour and counter-movements were 
dramatically weakened, and instability returned. 
3.2.2 1970s – 1990s - Reagan, Thatcher, Friedman, Washington Consensus 
The 1970s also brought about a distinct change in the organisation of the capitalist 
system. The ideology of the period was characterised by the “reactionary exhumation of 
the simplistic neoclassical and monetarist economic theory of the 1920‟s” embodied in 
the principles of Freidrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman (Gunder Frank, 1980: 13). It 
also saw a “new international division of labour [with] the reincorporation of the socialist 
economies in the world market and the transfer of certain world market industries both 
to them and to selected parts of the Third World, where wages are lower and labour 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 45 
 
discipline is higher” (Gunder Frank, 1980: 15). The period was also characterised by the 
1973 oil shock, “when the OPEC countries formed a successful cartel of oil producing 
countries and increased the price four fold” (Hoogvelt, 2010: 57). The reasons for this 
shock can be traced back to the United States. By the time the Bretton Woods system 
met its demise, there existed more American currency outside of the US than 
domestically. This condition is known as dollar overhang. Repatriation of this money 
would cause considerable inflation within the US economy. The Nixon administration 
had been planning for an increase in the oil price for some time (Hoogvelt, 2010: 57). 
When the increase occurred it solved a number of problems the US faced. It corrected 
the dollar overhang problem as all oil transactions were completed in US dollars. It 
harmed the rising economies of Europe and Japan who were far more dependent on 
imported oil than the US. It gave OPEC countries extra funds to buy military equipment 
from the US, with the 1973 Yom Kippur war against Israel providing an impetus for 
these purchases. It also provided American oil companies with additional revenues. 
Though the US dollar was no longer pegged to the gold standard, it maintained its 
status as a reserve currency for the world through its linkage to oil (Hoogvelt, 2010: 58). 
Valéry Giscard d‟Estaing, serving in the capacity of Charles de Gaulle‟s Minister of 
Finance, once noted that this status gave the US an “exorbitant privilege” (Boltho, 
2011). Indeed, despite the demise of Bretton Woods, the US was able to “maintain their 
hegemony over world monetary order” (Hoogvelt, 2010: 58). 
During this time, achievements of the counter-movement‟s policies, existing in the 
Bretton Woods institutions and the relative strength of the state in relation to capital, 
which protected labour and the individual from the market, were dramatically scaled 
back. The leadership in this retaliatory conservative movement was taken by Margaret 
Thatcher of the United Kingdom (UK) and Ronald Reagan of the US. The change can 
be described as a revolution occurring from above, steered by the capitalist hegemony 
(Altvater, 2009: 73). Two critical moments in the respective leaders‟ offensive against 
workers and counter-hegemonic movements were the defeats of striking labour unions, 
the “crushing of the air traffic controllers‟ union in the US (1981) [and] the Thatcher 
government‟s victory over the National Union of Mineworkers in Britain (1984-85)” 
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(McNally, 2012: 44). The transformation was encouraged and driven by the dominant 
social and political elite who wished to alter the “social, political and economic forces” 
(Altvater, 2009: 73). Milton Friedman served as both an acolyte and a mentor to the 
leaders of the US and the UK. He termed the change a “successful counterrevolution” 
against Keynesianism (Altvater, 2009: 73). With the advent of policies that weakened 
the state‟s control over finance, the pendulum swung back in favour of the self-regulated 
market, suppressed since the end of the Second World War. The UK liberalised its 
markets and with this the control of financial instruments such as interest and exchange 
rates were removed from the hands of states and entrusted to private actors, namely 
banks, investment funds, and multinational corporations. With their newfound power, 
these actors created instruments to entrench their position and generate higher returns. 
States which resisted were subjected to assaults on their currency and industry, with the 
purpose of inducing them to move to the neo-liberal model, one which abandoned 
“exchange controls, fixed interest rates, credit control, prescribed assets, and so forth” 
(Altvater, 2009: 73). Capital prevailed once again; it had retaken its dominant position 
and could once more act against a state‟s and society‟s interests with relative impunity.  
Accompanying these arcane changes were new opportunities for some, although they 
could hardly be classified as representative of the general population. Large-scale 
deregulation occurred which released “the strategies of large enterprises from the 
constraints which states‟ policies can otherwise represent” (Amin and Luckin, 1996: 
231). These organizations would not work to promote social good, but rather to make a 
profit. Unlike a coherent state-led system, this type of formation begets not order but 
instead chaos. The financial disorder which led to the Great Depression resulted in 
stronger regulations on the financial sector. The agencies responsible for overseeing 
them “were the last line of defense against both excessively risky and unscrupulous 
behaviour by the banks” (Stiglitz, 2010: 15). However, those active in the finance 
industry were patient and persistent, and their efforts were eventually rewarded. “[T]he 
government had not only stripped away existing regulations but also failed to adopt new 
ones in response to the changing financial landscape” (Stiglitz, 2010: 15). Additionally, 
individuals “who didn‟t understand why regulation was necessary – and accordingly 
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believed it was unnecessary – became regulators” (Stiglitz, 2010: 15). Adapting to these 
changes, the wizards of the financial sector expanded their boundaries and accordingly 
reaped huge rewards, while concurrently dramatically increasing the financialised profits 
in comparison to those from the real economy (Stiglitz, 2010: 46). While “new credit-
instruments were created for both consumers and financiers” the groundwork was also 
laid for the future cracks and shocks which would shake the system (Stiglitz, 2010: 46). 
Many of the changes which were ushered in by this new era were nothing short of 
drastic. Outside of the core, many states became subservient to international financial 
institutions through crippling and unmanageable debts (Hoogvelt, 2010). Yet, even 
within the core, this process entailed a marked move by capital against labour 
movements by promoting labour mobility or the idea that regulations surrounding labour 
should be relaxed so the market can be entirely fluid and find its equilibrium. This is 
hardly a novel argument. Polanyi references Ludwig von Mises‟ statement that if 
workers “did not act as trade unionists, but reduced their demands and changed their 
locations and occupations according to the requirements of the labor market, they could 
eventually find work” (Polanyi, 1944: 176). In this manner, labour is regarded as a 
commodity - one‟s individuality, culture, and desires subsumed by the market. The 
assertion that “unemployment in capitalist countries is due to the fact that the policy 
both of the government and of the trade unions aims at maintaining a level of wages 
which is out of harmony with the existing productivity of labor” is arguably correct 
(Polanyi, 1944: 176). It rests upon the idea that a worker must abandon all trappings of 
life and become simply an automaton, willing to find employment wherever and however 
the market would accept him. If the worker were without any demand or expectation of 
remuneration, and rather proceeding with a simple acceptance that this is the 
equilibrium that the free market has found for him, then conceivably there would be no 
unemployment. However it is a rather dismal prospect, and reflects “what the 
employers‟ demand for mobility of labor and flexibility of wages really means: […] a 
market in which human labor is a commodity” (Polanyi, 1944: 177). 
With the implementation of the neo-liberal model, there came about “major 
reorganisations of work process and technology.” (McNally, 2009: 47) Indeed, “the 
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struggle for control over the production process is conditioned by technology” (Cox, 
1987: 19). The neo-liberal changes involved “significant destruction of capital, as plants 
were closed and workers sacked” (McNally, 2009: 47). During this time “Britain lost 25 
percent of its manufacturing industry”, whilst in the other European countries, 
employment in manufacturing industries declined by approximately seven million, or one 
quarter, between 1973 and the late 1980s (McNally, 2009: 47). Across Europe and 
North America there was a reduction in union membership while “capital pushed down 
real wages, shed labour, broke down shop-floor organisations of workers, sped up and 
intensified work-processes, and introduced robotics and computerised production-
systems” (McNally, 2009: 47). 
The results of these policies were dramatic and decisive. Labour and counter-
movements were crushed; states were weakened; the individual and society were 
subservient to the market. Financial institutions and corporations reaped dizzying 
rewards. Problems surrounding employment, which neo-liberalism professed to solve 
with its prescription of labour mobility, rose due to “the expansion of the informal 
economy, of precarious labour; distribution in income and wealth became more unequal 
in most countries and in the world as a whole; the number of millionaires increased as 
well as the number of poor peoples” (Altvater, 2009: 75). The future expectations of the 
working class became dire, with many economies in crisis. There were detrimental 
effects to social systems, the stability of the political system, and the environment. 
However, this period heralded a new „Golden Age‟ for financiers and their asset owners.  
Neo-liberalism brought about “the biggest upward redistribution in the West in over a 
century” (Wade, 2009: 12). Beginning in 1980, the share of wealth which was 
accumulated by top one percent of affluent individuals in the US, “took off like a rocket 
to reach 22.5 percent by 2006, the same as in 1929” (Wade, 2009: 12). This period also 
saw a rapid expansion of finance around the world under the aegis of globalisation. In 
the mid-1980s, “trading in financial and other assets became an increasingly central 
activity for the investment banks, and for many commercial banks, too” (Gowan, 2009: 
8). The end of Bretton Woods and the subsequent volatility of foreign exchange rates, 
the opportunities resulting from the liberalisation of domestic finance and the reduction, 
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or elimination, of capital controls made for a fertile environment for these activities 
(Gowan, 2009: 8). One normative process, which drove these changes, was the so-
called Washington Consensus; an idea imposed by powerful financial institutions such 
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Few would come to 
understand the effects of this consensus better than those in the developing world. 
Although they had gained a modicum of political independence, they did not receive 
economic independence. The IMF, the World Bank and the Washington Consensus 
came to represent the instruments through which economic colonisation continued 
(Stiglitz, 2010: 220). 
The fiscal regimen prescribed by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) was 
purported to be “for the benefit of the developing world” (Stiglitz, 2010: 220). The IFIs 
offered a strict regime of liberalisation which reflected the hegemonic agenda of the 
international managerial class. Indebted countries were offered conditional loans; the 
conditions being that they remove any structural resistance in their economies to global 
finance and production in return for funds to keep their administration and state 
functioning. The result was a recolonisation under the financial markets, with the wealth 
of the land plundered, individuals reduced to labourers, a deterioration in working and 
living standards, dislocation, and conflict. Incomes were stagnant and “where there was 
growth, the wealth went to those at the top” (Stiglitz, 2010: 220). The Washington 
Consensus proved to be “one of the most efficient globalising forces after the 
liberalisation of the financial markets” (Altvater, 2009: 74). The program was worldwide 
in scale, encompassing and subsuming disparate states throughout the globe. These 
states had one major characteristic in common which guaranteed the success of the 
program; “they [were] all highly indebted and they therefore [had] to follow the rules of 
global financial markets and their regulating institutions” (Altvater, 2009: 74). Those in 
developing countries began to see that the Washington Consensus “was just a cover for 
old commercial interests” (Stiglitz, 2010: 220).  
3.2.3 Crisis in the Contemporary Global Financial System 
The conflict and interplay between the market and counter-movements have brought 
about a crisis which affects individuals throughout the world. One can trace its genesis 
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through the often gradual, and at times sudden, resurgence of the market and finance 
as the preeminent power in the world. Hyman Minsky provided a hypothesis which 
becomes relevant in light of the financial crisis. He speaks of the foundation of modern 
capitalist development as being the exchange of present money for future money. The 
future profit is based on a guarantee that commitments will be met and loans will be 
repaid. He refers to the „veil of money‟ and illustrates the difference between its place in 
the Quantity Theory and Keynes‟ view of the concept. The Quantity Theory views the 
veil of money as similar to Marxian theory, in that a good is exchanged for money which 
is in turn exchanged for a good. In reality, the process is a good for a good and the 
money represents a veil between the two. Keynes and Minsky interpret the veil as being 
“money connected with financing through time (Minsky, 1993: 3). The original financing 
is for the investment which will, one assumes, return profits in the future. This presents 
a significant evolution, as “in a capitalist economy the past, the present, and the future 
are linked not only by capital assets and the labour force but also by financial relations” 
(Minsky, 1993: 5). The increasing complexity of this system, and the myriad actors 
involved, mean that the financial system will behave differently than it has in past eras. 
Minsky‟s financial instability hypothesis highlights these differences. It is “a theory of the 
impact of debt on system behaviour and also incorporates the manner in which debt is 
validated” (Minsky, 1993: 6).One of the major differences between past theoretical 
contributions is the evolution of banking and bakers, or other “intermediaries of finance” 
(Minsky, 1993: 6). These “merchants of debt” seek profit and this fact changes the 
characteristics of the banking system (Minsky, 1993: 6). Here Minsky enumerates three 
categories of finance: hedge, speculative and Ponzi. Hedge finance is based on equity 
and these organisations “can fulfill all of their contractual payment obligations by their 
cash flows” (Minsky, 1993: 7). Speculative finance can meet its payment commitments 
but cannot repay the principal loan, leaving investors reliant upon continually 
transferring their liabilities. The last category, Ponzi finance, is the most dangerous of 
the three. Investors can repay neither their principle nor interest through the income 
they generate. This leaves them with the option of selling assets or borrowing further, 
both of which reduce their likelihood to make payments in the future. An economy which 
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relies on hedge funding tends to be relatively close to equilibrium. The greater the 
reliance upon speculative and Ponzi finance, the bedrock of the Wall Street System 
prior to the crisis, the greater the inherent instability of the system, 
The first theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is relatively simple; that an 
economy contains financing regimes which are stable and unstable. The second 
theorem is that over periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial 
relations that make for a stable system to financial relations that make for an unstable 
system (Minsky, 1993: 8). Here the hypothesis can be seen in the US financial system 
where, in the period following the Second World War, and especially in recent years, the 
economy transformed into the latter type of regime. This is exacerbated by monetary 
constraint, such as in the US, where the monetary policy is one of “Constrained 
discretion” with the intention of curbing inflation (Bernake, 2003). This results in “the 
speculative units [becoming] Ponzi units and the net worth of Ponzi units” quickly 
evaporating (Minsky, 1993: 8). The ultimate result is a collapse in asset values. The 
collapse does not come from an exogenous shock; rather, the “business cycles of 
history are compounded out of (i) the internal dynamics of capitalism and (ii) the system 
of interventions and regulations designed to keep the economy operating within 
reasonable bounds” (Minsky, 1993: 8). Minsky‟s hypothesis has been borne out by the 
2007 crisis. 
This situation in the US, the heartland of the free market, triggered the current crisis with 
its reverberations felt around the world. The crisis has showcased the flaws of the neo-
liberal agenda and demonstrated that it is an utter failure. Banks, funds and financial 
institutions have reaped “as much as possible of the surplus produced in the real 
economy; and by doing so they are pushing it into a crisis” (Altvater, 2009: 77). The 
profits from the real economy currently decline while the returns on financial assets are 
soaring, leading towards an inevitable outcome; “the financial innovations work as a 
mechanism of increasing the yields of financial assets of repression of the real 
economy” (Altvater, 2009: 80). The resulting financial structure is the driving force 
behind the ongoing crisis. It was spectacularly successful for those fortunate enough to 
belong to the richest groups in the US. As real industry declined, the financial sector 
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was easily the most profitable sector in the US and British economies. “In 2006, no less 
than 40% of American corporate profits accrued to the financial sector” (Gowan, 2009: 
6). 
The mechanics of the system derived from the neo-liberal model and the increasing 
power of financial actors and financialisation. The actions which these actors undertook 
were often disconnected from reality, a symptom of a disembedded market. One 
assumption under which proponents of the free market laboured was that of the efficient 
market hypothesis; “that market prices are correct because they reflect fundamentals” 
(Wade, 2009: 18). While the assumption was made in order to create economic models, 
its truth did not translate into the real world. It assumed that all actors had a correct 
knowledge of the risks involved and that any change in the system would be 
instrumental; this has proven untrue in history, as exemplified by the American Savings 
and Loan Crisis or hyperinflation in Weimar Germany; nor is it true now, as Dick Fuld 
and Lehman Brothers have proven to the world (Wade, 2009: 18). The fundamentals 
upon which the system was based were both incorrect and unrealistic. 
The new Wall Street System was the centre of financial globalisation. It was based upon 
the fiat dollar, where the currency could no longer be converted to any resource, such 
as gold (Wallace, 1980: 49). Another characteristic was “the privatization of exchange 
rate risk and the sweeping away of exchange controls” (Gowan, 2009: 7). Asset price 
bubbles were one of the primary income generators for financiers involved in the Wall 
Street system. Minsky wrote of the inherent instability of this type of financial 
phenomenon (Minsky, 1977). Those on Wall Street, along with their supposed 
regulators, believed they could use his theory strategically by “blowing bubbles, bursting 
them, and manag[e] the fallout by blowing some more” (Gowan, 2009: 10). Time after 
time, Wall Street would “enter a particular market, generate a price bubble within it, 
make big speculative profits, then withdraw, bursting the bubble” (Gowan, 2009: 9). 
Developing economies were especially prone to this. One might expect a financial 
system to promote stability, but there existed greater incentives for creating booms and 
busts. The housing bubble precipitated the 2007 crisis. ”But the bursting of these 
bubbles did not cause the crash; rather it operated as a trigger” (McNally, 2012: 45). 
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Responsible was the widespread inability to confront the contradictions in the structure 
of the financial system and the activities which occurred within it. The modern 
instruments and actors were simply a new generation with new tools. Instruments which 
packaged debts, including the now notorious sub-prime mortgages, were sold and 
distributed by investment banks, The packaged debts were revealed to be of 
questionable value, if not altogether worthless, despite what rating agencies had earlier 
claimed. When this was exposed, investors panicked and fled (Gowan, 2009: 18). This 
withdrawal of confidence and funds precipitated the credit crunch and the ensuing crisis. 
The countries which had closely followed the neo-liberal prescription, the most 
financially open and globalised, were, unsurprisingly, most affected by the crisis. The 
ideology which had underpinned this framework now had “a big role in the rapid spread 
of the crisis around the world” (Stiglitz, 2010: 236). 
During the global crisis of the 1930s Keynes wrote of the „fetish‟ of liquidity; “a false 
sense of security an investor develops about the liquidity of the market as opposed to 
the liquidity of his own portfolio” (Nesvetailova and Palan, 2008: 168). In fact, Keynes 
proved prescient. The current crisis was precipitated by a crash in liquidity. 
Securitisation and financialisation gave a false sense of liquidity to the market; 
concentrating profits and power in the hands of the financial sector. The value of US 
financial stocks grew by 78% between 2000 and 2007 while the general stock market 
rose only 6%. The bubble was propagated by the banking system, with the support of 
the US government and the US Federal Reserve, which encouraged the illusory liquidity 
and allowed the subprime mortgage market to grow beyond the capacity of the banking 
system (Nesvetailova and Palan, 2008: 174). This resulted in the popping of the bubble. 
“Liquidity [had] vanished, in particular, from the markets for complex financial 
derivatives, which had thrived during the securitization boom” (Nesvetailova and Palan, 
2008: 167). It also “evaporated from the interbank markets, signalling banks‟ reluctance 
to lend to one another” (Nesvetailova and Palan, 2008: 167). During optimal times 
liquidity flourishes and optimism allows assets to be traded with ease; yet in difficult 
times, such as the crisis, it disappears and what remains are immovable assets and bad 
debts. In the feeding frenzy from 2000 to 2007, safe, traditional styles of banking were 
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seen as conservative, while the individuals who peddled the new instruments and 
eventually drove the economy off the precipice, were deemed sophisticated and 
shrewd. The market system, characterised by “belief in robust economic fundamentals, 
the undervaluation of risks, especially the liquidity risk, the aggressive expansion of new 
borrowings and, in many cases, the use of quasi-legal investment techniques and 
outright swindling, flourished” (Nesvetailova and Palan, 2008: 171). Also complicit was 
the existence of moral hazard; that no risk was too great because the financial system 
and institutions were too big to fail. This belief was supported by past events; “the fallout 
from the Tequila crisis of 1994 to 1995, the Asian crisis of 1997 to 1998, the Long-Term 
Capital Management fiasco of 1998 and even the dot-com collapse of 2000 to 2001” 
(McNally, 2009: 54) None of these crises were capable of affecting the financial 
institutions in the West in a manner significant enough to cause large scale 
restructuring, at least not before governments and IFIs would become involved. The 
incentives which drove the financial system were mismatched with promoting social 
good. The innovations “that were the pride of the financial system, were steps in the 
wrong direction” (Stiglitz, 2010: 114). Additionally, the sheer size of the financial system 
and the massive banks made them impossible to comprehend, let alone regulate or 
manage. Stiglitz references Edward Lilly, who became the manager of the insurance 
company American International Group (AIG) following its bailout by the American 
government; “When I answered the call for help and joined AIG in September 2008, one 
thing quickly became apparent: the company‟s overall structure is too complex, too 
unwieldy, and too opaque for its component business to be managed as one entity” 
(Stiglitz, 2010: 114). 
The financial system, in the years immediately following the dismantling of Bretton 
Woods System, avoided a systemic crisis. This was not simply due to financial 
innovation and the availability of easy credit for individual consumers, corporate 
interests and governments. In that time monetary policy did, in the core economies, 
create crises in certain sectors. In peripheral economies, it also resulted in many 
national crises, such as Russia in 1998 and Argentina in 2000 (McNally, 2009: 54). 
During the neo-liberal period “there was a real increase in profitability that allowed 
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actual accumulation to occur” (McNally, 2009: 54). Bubbles, through asset inflation, did 
not begin in the 1970s but rather can be seen to start in 1996. After this time multiple 
crises occurred due to central bank policy, led by the US Federal Reserve. They began 
to aim for lower interest rates in an effort to keep the crises at bay following the “East-
Asian Crisis (1997), the failure of the Long Term Capital Management hedge-fund 
(1998), the Russian Crisis (1998) and the dot.com meltdown (2000–1)” (McNally, 2009: 
54). After this time a gulf arose between the actual creation of wealth and the value of 
assets. East Asia‟s growth also demonstrates that credit was not the sole cause of 
economic expansion during this period. In recent times, the “massive FDI flows into 
East Asia, the new industrial zones with tens of thousands of factories and millions of 
workers, the huge increases in the size of the world working class,” would not have 
been possible through the creation of credit alone (McNally, 2009: 54). 
Konings and Panitch view the most recent crisis as being of a special type when 
compared with similar earlier events. Most previous financial crises occurred either in 
peripheral economies, or, the effects were negligible to the average individual in the US, 
such as the Long Term Capital Management crisis. However the recent crisis was 
“shaped so profoundly by specifically American institutions and practices” and thus 
provides a view of the internal contractions of their hegemonic model (Konings and 
Panitch, 2009: 30) These internal contradictions are concerning given “the quotidian 
ways US power is embedded in and operates through the structures of global finance” 
(Konings and Panitch, 2009: 31) The links between the Wall Street financiers and 
government are intimate, so much so that it is difficult to imagine comprehensive and 
principled oversight by government officials, especially in times of crisis. Then Secretary 
of the Treasury, Hank Paulson, was central to the coordination of the original infusion of 
liquidity, that being hundreds of billions of dollars, to the ailing financial institutions on 
Wall Street, “where until [the year before] he had worked as an executive at Goldman 
Sachs” (Konings and Panitch, 2009: 31-32). In fact, on a broader level, there was also 
no firm separation of powers, as “[t]he federal government was both market participant 
and regulator” (Konings and Panitch, 36). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 56 
 
Konings and Panitch do not see the crisis as undermining the legitimacy of US 
hegemony. Rather than the crisis heralding an emancipatory change, “financial elites 
have proved very adept at not only responding to these pressures but using them in 
such a way as to create new regulatory frameworks that have laid the foundations for 
the further growth of business” (Konings and Panitch, 2009: 50). US citizens are 
intimately involved with the hegemonic practices, and through the collusion between the 
government and the financial sector, there is unlikely to be a transformative change 
emanating from this area. The system‟s “legitimacy is an attribute of mundane, 
everyday practices and it is constructed through patterns of interactions fraught with 
unintended consequences and unacknowledged interdependencies” (Konings and 
Panitch, 2009: 54). A transformative change “would require a far more radical program, 
informed by a far more penetrating analysis of imperial finance, than has so far 
appeared on the political agenda” (Konings and Panitch, 2009: 54). Given the 
penetration of the hegemonic model in the American citizens‟ consciousness, it appears 
unlikely that such a movement will be produced in the US. Thus, as will be done in 
Chapter 4, it is instructive to regard the possibilities of a transformative movement 
emerging from areas which are less comfortable with the structures of imperialist 
finance.  
3.4 Conclusion 
The globalised economic system has been embroiled in a severe crisis since 2007. 
Globalisation has brought, and has been ushered in by, advances in transportation and 
communication. This has been driven by, in many cases, the financial market. In the 
accelerated world “time is money and the shorter the cycles of financial investment the 
higher the revenues” (Altvater, 2009: 10). Hardware and software are deployed to 
“exploit all possible spaces for making money even when laws and moral rules have to 
be broken” (Altvater, 2009: 81). Events proceed nearly instantaneously; “we operate in 
a “spaceless and timeless world… The „annihilation of time by space and space by 
time‟, which Marx mentions in the Grundrisse, is inscribed in the neo-liberal belief 
system” (Altvater, 2009: 80). Gone is any consideration of time or space, history or 
culture, individuals or humanity. 
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The American world model, and its associated financial structure, seems to have lost its 
legitimacy. Under the Clinton administration, international institutions such as the UN 
were disregarded in favour of the narrow NATO alliance. (Arrighi, 2005: 21). The IFIs 
morphed from their original design at the Bretton Woods Conference to become tools 
used by the US to modify the market to its benefit. Even domestically the hegemon 
seems to have lost legitimacy. At the G-8 summit in Washington in 2004, demonstrators 
were so numerous that the state had to use extreme and repressive security measures. 
To control protests in the capitol of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, there “was 
tear-gassing, clubbing and mass arrests – so many the police had to use buses for 
transport. The message was loud and clear, and the police were used literally to stifle 
the truth” (Zizek, 2009: 9).  
The capitalist world model is facing serious challenges on practical and ideological 
fronts. The hegemon, the US, seems to be on a path towards an actual economic 
bankruptcy. Their actions, and how they are perceived around the world, show that, if 
they were once a “city set on a hill” (2 Kings 10:3), they no longer carry that moral 
authority. The other partner in the core, the European continent, also appears to be 
destined for a destruction of sorts; unfortunately with the event lacking the creativity 
Schumpeter would wish for. Across the world, the seemingly inexorable progress of the 
capitalist system has led to inequality at best and, at worst, widespread immiseration. 
The ongoing global economic crisis illuminates the fact that the status quo cannot 
remain. 
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Chapter 4 - South Africa, Transformation and World System Crisis 
 
“All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last 
 compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his 
 relations with his kind”        
 Marx and Engels (2010: 16). 
“Well it don‟t seem to me quite so funny what some people are gonna do for 
 money. There‟s a brand new gimmick everyday just to take somebody‟s 
 money away”         
 Dylan, B. (1962) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
A crisis can be considered from many different perspectives. It is doubtless that, if left 
unchecked, crises often cause death and disorder for many. Yet, one can also view a 
crisis as an opportunity for a systemic reorganisation. In the natural world an event such 
as a forest fire can be catastrophic. However it can also serve many purposes: 
removing dead and obsolete material, providing the opportunity for seeds to germinate, 
and essentially giving the resident organisms a chance to start relatively afresh and 
unburdened. This section will posit that our artificially created structures and 
organisations do not deviate from this logic. When society becomes encumbered by 
parasitic and non-productive elements, it may be that challenging times, rather than a 
harbinger of misery, should be understood as a chance for renewal. It begins with a 
Marxist understanding of crises as determined by economics and class conflict and how 
a crisis can lead to an emancipatory change. Following the World Systems approach, it 
regards a semi-peripheral state, South Africa, to understand the effects and ramification 
of the current crisis and whether the balance of social forces, between those aligned 
with the elite non-hegemonic project and those oppose, constitute an opportunity for a 
transformative change. While there is much ink spilled over what occurs in the global 
North, the opportunity to view the effects and possibilities from a different perspective 
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proves illuminative. Finally, it will conclude with the challenges and opportunities which 
accompany the ongoing crisis as a challenge to the hegemonic project, and, in turn, 
may transform the World System and its social and economic relations. From this 
examination it will be found that the global economic system has, in a sense, devoured 
itself. Capitalism is “a vampire system in arguing that it could only reproduce itself on an 
expanded scale by absorbing non-capitalist production, thereby infecting the life-blood 
on which it depended” (Fine, 2008a: 1). The inherent contradictions of capitalism, 
compounded by the financial crisis, have created a crisis in the legitimation. This allows 
the possibility of the articulation and mobilisation of an alter-hegemonic project. 
However, the weakness and incoherence of the possible counter-movements mean that 
a passive revolution is more likely than an emancipatory transformation of the World 
System.  
4.2 Crises 
Economic crises are cyclical, and with each repetition there is a test of capitalism, “each 
time more threateningly” (Marx and Engels, 2010: 17). These crises result in the 
destruction of both physical items and productive forces. Marx examines the source of 
how these crises arise, an “epidemic of overproduction”, resulting from “too much 
civilisation, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce” 
(Marx and Engels, 2010: 17). The forces of production are no longer a benefit to capital 
and, thus, must be crippled and at least partially destroyed. Not only the relations of 
production but societal relations themselves must be redefined. Of course this is simple 
to realise with practical examples. The 1970s crisis in the United Kingdom provoked the 
emasculation of labour unions. The events of September 11th, 2001 gave the United 
States (US) license to increase the level of surveillance in their domestic security 
apparatus (see USA PATRIOT Act, 2008) while lashing out violently across the globe 
(See War in Afghanistan, War in Iraq, War in Libya, Drone Strikes in Pakistan, Somalia, 
Yemen, War on Terror, etc.). Marx confines himself to a more economically-grounded 
argument. As the society and the property of the bourgeois are threatened they must 
react to their relative weakness when facing the lower classes. Their method of 
regaining firm control of capital and therefore society is “by enforced destruction of a 
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mass of productive forces […] by the conquest of new markets, and by the more 
thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more 
extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises 
are prevented” (Marx and Engels, 2010: 17). The current situation does differ from the 
time of Marx and Engels. As discussed in Section 2.2, the increasing sophistication of 
technologies of production has lessened capital‟s reliance on the middle and working 
class, and even threatens to eliminate the middle class.  
Habermas sees a crisis as “the notion of an objective power depriving a subject of part 
of his sovereignty” (Habermas, 1973: 643). For him, the crisis of capitalism is one of 
legitimation, and a systemic crisis occurs when “the legitimation system fails to maintain 
the necessary level of mass loyalty. (Habermas, 1973: 655) This can be seen in the 
financial crisis, as, “capital violates its own free-market nostrums and uses public 
resources to bail out the system, thus opening up space for debates about alternative 
uses of public powers” (McNally, 2009: 72). One can think of the domestic outrage in 
the US surrounding the „socialist‟ Troubled Asset Relief Program (Hendrickson, 2012). 
Yet the primary actors in the financial sector had arrived, „hat in hand‟, not only asking 
for, but demanding assistance. It would appear that the dictums of Von Hayek, 
Friedman and his „Chicago Boys‟, and other adherents to the Washington Consensus, 
which had driven the world economy for decades, were conveniently forgotten, at least 
until the funds had transferred hands. These are the events which highlight the inherent 
contradictions of the current world economic organisation and open “up space for 
debates about alternative uses of public powers” (McNally, 2009: 72). Systemic crises 
are, therefore, “moments of great danger and opportunity for the world‟s workers” 
(McNally, 2009: 72). 
One of the important elements of this crisis is that it was precipitated by the debt of the 
working class. Especially in North America, and to a certain degree Europe, debt has 
long been a nefarious weapon in the struggle between capital and labour. The 
repayment of loans, for example to a moneylender, a pawnshop, loan shark, or a bank, 
is an ideal instrument for keeping workers in line. Seligman‟s The Economics of 
Installment Selling provides the perfect example. Written in 1927, the beginning the era 
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of Fordism and Taylorism, it praised credit based sales, as, among other reasons, “[the 
family with car payments to make would be forced to work hard to make the payments” 
(Konings and Panitch, 2009: 36). These debts encourage longer working hours, 
alienation from family and society, and an unhealthy devotion to capital accumulation, 
just so one can spare oneself from penury. Debt is a construct, similar, and inextricably 
linked, to money. Both hold value only if everyone, or a critical mass, agree that they 
are worthwhile, thereby validating their status as a societal norm. Yet, those who do 
much of the lending, the financial sector, have done the most to tarnish their own 
credibility through their egregious behaviour. A debtor should not be asked to repay his 
loan, when the creditor has not been able to pay his own. The disillusionment which 
accompanies this process should promote a critical view and a re-evaluation of what is 
deemed valuable in society. The “politics of massive government-bailouts, in which the 
debt of major financial institutions is assumed by the state, raises important openings 
for campaigns to reduce and eliminate working-class debt and debts in the Global 
South” (McNally, 2009: 74). It also provokes the question: Could these funds, which are 
available to save banks, instead be directed “to build social housing, repudiate the 
South‟s debts to the North, socialise failing industries, convert them to green production, 
and preserve jobs” (McNally, 2009: 74). 
The current global economic organisation has reduced “economic policies to the status 
of crisis management policies” (Amin and Luckin, 1996: 250). Rather than reshaping the 
economic regime, they merely represent “a perfectly coherent set of crisis management 
policies offering financial placements to capital which would otherwise be massively 
devalued through the lack of any profitable outlet in the expansion of systems of 
production” (Amin and Luckin, 2006: 250). Over the last decades this process has been 
motivated by an either morally defunct, or tragically inept, banking class. Though the 
“high rewards and single-minded focus on making money might attract more than its fair 
share of the ethically challenged, […] the universality of the problem suggests that there 
are fundamental flaws in the system” (Stiglitz, 2010: xix). These facts alert us that “the 
cant dished out in the past by the US Treasury and IMF is over” (Gowan, 2009: 26). The 
US financial system and its banking assumptions have been revealed as a morbid 
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farce. The EU is no better, as their domestic financial problems are seemingly 
worsening daily. (Donahue, 2012) 
The economic model promoted, exported and imposed by the core over the last years 
should be consigned to the dustbin of history. This crisis has made this apparent. 
Traditionally, there have been many individuals, located geographically within the core, 
who would challenge these norms and preordained orders. However, policymakers in 
the West have shown themselves to be either unwilling or unable to make structural 
changes to relieve the effects of the crisis, at least not in any more than a triage 
manner. Nor have they seemingly made any concrete steps to prevent a recurrence. 
This may perhaps be due to the fact that they are beholden to capital. As an example of 
this one might consider the $6 billion expected to be spent on the 2012 US Presidential 
elections and the question from whom, and for what purpose, the finances are produced 
(Hebblethwaite, 2012). Alternatively, the lacking systemic change could be due to a 
dearth of perspective and creativity. The next section will, rather than regarding the 
economic crisis from a Western-centric perspective, address the problems and 
possibilities facing South Africa. The links to both the industrialised North and the 
developing South place the state and its citizens, in an interesting, if not entirely 
enviable, position. To contextualise the South African situation the colonial project must 
first be examined.  
4.3 Historical 
The situation of South Africa, as with almost every state located in the periphery or 
semi-periphery, should be placed in the context of the impetus of the colonial conquest. 
Throughout the 1800s, the most rapid period of colonial expansion, Europe was faced 
with wars, recessions and depressions, and other forms of stagnation and conflict. 
European society was still very unequal and therefore the consumer market very small 
and easily exhausted, especially in times of crisis. Insufficient rewards domestically 
drove the capitalist class across the globe in search of riches. These were realised 
through „discoveries‟ and conquests of vast, nearly untouched, resources and labour to 
be exploited. “The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the 
bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle 
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everywhere, establish connections everywhere” (Marx and Engels, 2010: 16). The 
capitalist expansion beyond Europe was relentless and transformative. The imperatives 
which drove the system were often imposed through extreme measures, with tales of 
violence and genocide replete amongst the history of colonial expansion (Scheper-
Hughes and Bourgois, 2004; Adhikari, 2010). This process for physical and ideational 
conquest “compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of 
production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to 
become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image” 
(Marx and Engels, 2010: 16). It is uncertain as to whether the image of European 
society would be appealing to the uninitiated, but a man-made cataclysm befalling one‟s 
family, community, and society, can bring about a less defiant, more flexible, 
perspective. 
Polanyi also provides an analysis of how the colonial project was carried out. For 
conquest to be successful: 
 “the colonist needs lands as a site for the sake of the wealth buried in it, or 
whether he merely wishes to constrain the native to produce a surplus of 
food and raw materials, is often irrelevant; nor does it make much difference 
whether the native works under the direct supervision of the colonist or only 
under some form of indirect compulsion, for in every and any case the 
social and cultural system of the native life must first be shattered” (Polanyi, 
1944: 178). 
This phenomenon of destroying the „social and cultural system‟, while reprehensible, is 
not unique to the process of colonialism and colonisation. Rather it is a procedure which 
had already occurred centuries before in Western Europe with the development of 
capitalism and the challenges which arose from the alienation of the individual from his 
or her land and community. Though “there was little likeness in the responses to these 
challenges”, they were both “stages in the subordination of the surface of the planet to 
the needs of an industrial society” (Polanyi, 1944: 178). The early leaders, the Dutch, 
Spanish and Portuguese, were followed later by the dominance of the British and the 
French, with the Germans and the Americans following towards the end of the 1800s. 
During this time, the countries striving to expand their empire, “saw underdeveloped 
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regions as immense supply depots for the cheap production of raw materials” which 
could be harvested to the profit of their economies. This process is what turned 
“Jamaica into a sugar plantation, Sri Lanka into a large scale tea producer, Zambia into 
a copper mine and the Middle East into an oil field” (De Souza, 1986: 15). 
The process affects individuals in the core as well as those located in the periphery. 
Even if these individuals do not meet, their relationship, through the global market, 
shapes the relative groups and societies through interactions. Countries around the 
world are transformed as “[t]he bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world 
market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country” 
(Marx and Engels, 2010: 16). In the core, this changes the dynamics of labour and 
domestic industries, or the means and relations of production. “Old-established national 
industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by 
new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilised 
nations” (Marx and Engels, 2010: 16). This aspect of globalisation is not unfamiliar 
today. Industry “no longer work[s] up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn 
from the remotest zones” (Marx and Engels, 2010: 16). The 1980s labour outrage in 
Britain was centred on the coal mining industry (Marsden and Hyland, 2009). Due, in 
part, to more fiscally profitable resource extraction in other parts of the world, the British 
working class found themselves at a comparative disadvantage, and unable to 
compete. The process continues today, albeit with broader concerns than simply 
physical resource extraction. Globalisation, and the affordability of transport and 
communication, has made labour a resource to be extracted from the periphery as well, 
where the working conditions and benefits to which labour in the core is accustomed, 
are scarce or unheard of. The change from domestic to globalised industry affects not 
only the means and relations of production in both the core and the periphery, but also 
the process of consumption. “[P]roducts are consumed, not only at home, but in every 
quarter of the globe” (Marx and Engels, 2010: 16). In the core, this changes the 
orientation of thoughts and desires, even if this is not acknowledged or recognised 
consciously. “In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we 
find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes” 
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(Marx and Engels, 2010: 16). The world becomes open and “[i]n place of the old local 
and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, 
universal inter-dependence of nations” (Marx and Engels, 2010: 16). 
Historically, imperialism expropriated land and societies “by sword and fire” (Bond, 
2010: 4; cf. Averbach, 1936). Modern market expansion is more insidious, and, because 
it is less confrontational and more ideational, perhaps all the more effective. One of the 
major tools of contemporary economic expansion, or dispossession, is, similar to the 
process of disciplining labour, that of debt and its repayment. As reviewed in the 
previous chapter, the exchange of monies between sovereign states, and the change in 
power relations which accompanies this, is not a novel creation. However, during the 
heyday of the Washington Consensus, debt in the periphery took on a greater 
significance. “National debts have been occasions for the transfer of state-assets in the 
South – electrical utilities, mines, national airlines and the like – to investors from the 
North” (McNally, 2009: 73). With this in mind, the current global situation must give one 
pause. The global economic crisis appears unending and “there can be little doubt that 
capital in the North will attempt to use impending financial and currency-crises in the 
Global South to similar ends” (McNally, 2009: 73). If global consumption, centred on the 
sickly European and North American economies, fails to recover, recovery in production 
will also be weak. As “heavily indebted consumers are retrenching amidst economic 
uncertainty and high levels of unemployment, there can be little reasonable expectation 
of large spikes in demand” (McNally, 2012: 42) Many economies in the periphery‟s 
primary economic activities are as “hewers of wood and carriers of water” (Joshua 9:23) 
and depend upon export earnings as the backbone of national budgets. In a depressed 
economic climate, which has characterised global trade since the latest crisis, they will 
find few buyers of natural resources and therefore realise decreased export earnings, 
leaving tax revenue scarce. “This will inhibit their capacities to import food, medicine 
and other essentials, as well as to service existing debts” (McNally, 2009: 73). It will 
make weak “economies even less able to cope with internal vulnerabilities and 
development needs such as infrastructure investments” (Baker, 2008). South African, 
and other states, membership in the G20, illustrates “renewed attempts at core-
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periphery coercion by inviting these countries into the highly exclusive G7/G8, or, put 
more bluntly, by co-opting them into the rules and standards of the core-alliance 
coercion by ensuring official, and thus more tightly integrated relations with the IMF and 
World Bank” (Satgar, 2008: 64). It is within this uncertain, if not foreboding, context that 
one must understand the situation of South Africa, wedged in the semi-periphery, and 
an intermediary between the global North and South. 
4.4 South Africa 
4.4.1 History 
The history of imperial interaction with and within South Africa is a narrative of its own 
and cannot be adequately explored in this research (see Worden, 2000; Butler, 2009). 
However, the colonial project took a rather similar trajectory to most other locations. At a 
certain point, as the wealth beneath the soil became apparent, ”[t]he imperialists began 
to industrialise the country and to employ masses of cheap labour on the Natal 
plantations, in the diamond mines, the gold mines, in the industries connected with 
these mines, and at the big ports” (Bond, 2010: 4; cf. Averbach, 1936). The indigenous 
inhabitants had been driven off their previous land and these spaces were used “as 
reservoirs of cheap labour…In the cities the bourgeoisie built up an elaborate system of 
compounds, passes, and regulations to control the migratory labour from the reserves” 
(Bond, 2010: 4; cf. Averbach, 1936). As Marx had written, class struggles between 
labour and the bourgeoisie intensify during industrialisation and urbanisation. In order to 
preclude this, it was necessary to “prevent the formation of a stable, hereditary urban 
proletariat which would become used to the traditional methods of organisation and 
struggle – trade union and political – of city working classes all over the world” (Bond, 
2010: 4; cf. Averbach, 1936). To accomplish this, and forestall, at least for a time, an 
organised uprising, “the imperialist bourgeoisie segregated the Africans from each other 
tribally or otherwise, and from city political life by means of compounds, and allowed a 
drift back to the reserves after some time of slavery in the towns” (Bond, 2010: 4; cf. 
Averbach, 1936). Workers, especially in large industrial projects, became “whole 
populations conjured out of the ground” (Marx and Engels, 2010: 17). These phantasms 
would appear where there was work and then disappear afterwards. The situation of the 
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reserve labour force, and even the majority of labour in general, especially the informal 
sector, perhaps has not changed as dramatically since those times as one might hope. 
4.4.2 Transition 
The transition from the apartheid system was fraught with complexities, due to both 
internal strife and external pressure. During this time, South Africa went from being an 
international pariah, beleaguered by economic sanctions, to being fully integrated into 
the world economy, even though at disadvantageous terms. The timing of this transition, 
in regards to the prevailing global ideas and norms, could not have been worse. 
Communism had collapsed and the Washington Consensus was the model by which 
the states in the developing world were told to organise their economy. The apartheid 
state, though racially exclusive, exploitative, and repugnant in most manners, had, due 
to its international isolation, cultivated a relatively successful developmental state (Fine 
and Rustomjee, 1996). As international trading partners were few and far between, and 
dwindled over time, domestic production and markets were relied upon to maintain a 
functional economy and South Africa experienced “an inward looking industrialization 
[…] for the greater part of the 20th century” (Satgar, 2008: 6) This situation made 
apartheid South Africa an interesting example of Prebisch‟s dependencía theory as to 
how import substitution could build an independent economy and state.  
But if there were ever a moment to preclude radical change and implementation of 
nationalisation and socialism, which constituted much of the African National Congress‟ 
(ANC) rhetoric in the pre-transition period, it was in the years when no credible socialist 
option, and seemingly no plausible alternative to capitalism, existed. Their “transition to 
democracy coincided with the second decade of global neoliberal restructuring” (Satgar, 
2008: 66). Despite the assertion, in the Freedom Charter, adopted in 1955 at the 
Congress of the People, that “the wealth of South Africa, above and below her soils, 
belong to the people” (Freedom Charter, 1955), these pretensions were abandoned 
during the negotiations to end apartheid. The “promises to nationalize the banks, mines 
and monopoly capital were dropped; Nelson Mandela agreed to repay $25 billion of 
inherited apartheid-era foreign debt; the central bank was granted formal independence 
in an interim constitution” (Bond, 2010: 15). Newly embraced by the international order, 
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South Africa was assimilated into the global economy “on disadvantageous terms; and 
the International Monetary Fund provided an $850 million loan with standard 
Washington Consensus conditionality” (Bond, 2010: 15). The ANC allowed “the Bretton 
Woods institutions […] to set the parameters for post-apartheid South Africa‟s 
accumulation path and hence started indigenizing an Afro-neoliberalism through a 
South African voice” (Satgar, 2008: 50). Privatisation was widespread, investment rates 
were raised significantly and “by 1996 a neoliberal macroeconomic policy was formally 
adopted” (Bond, 2010: 15). Additionally, there was a change which Fine terms 
„financialisation‟; South African conglomerates moved their headquarters and were 
listed primarily in London or Melbourne, and the macroeconomic policy was “designed 
to manage the capacity of the South African conglomerates to disinvest” (Bond, 2010: 
13 cf. Fine 2008a).  
The transition of the economy resulted in a restructuring “on the terms of conglomerate 
capital” (Marais, 2009: 389) It was designed to service capital‟s needs and neutralise 
popular mass organisations. While the Left represented a popular movement, it “would 
find itself outsmarted, outmanoeuvred and, eventually, muscled out of the navigational 
centre of the transition” (Marais, 2011: 398) The formation of the Government of 
National Unity, under the leadership of the ANC, could be considered a “‟moment of 
hegemony‟; that is the strategic, moral and intellectual leadership was in place” (Satgar, 
2008: 56) However, every hegemonic situation is inherently unstable; the balance of 
forces is fluid and the hegemon must adapt. This could lead to a possible unravelling of 
hegemony, as the divergence between the rulers and the ruled widens. In South Africa, 
“[t]his increasingly became the reality after 1994 until 1996, when the transition from an 
instrumentalized to a bureaucratized civil society became more apparent” (Satgar, 
2008: 56). The leadership of this system demonstrated its morbidity as control was 
maintained “through subordinating national liberation forces to the discipline of 
bureaucratic centralism, cooption of leadership and limiting room for participatory, 
bottom up practices” (Satgar, 2008: 56). 
The political transition represented, arguably, a political emancipation. Legally codified 
rights and freedoms had vastly improved, and in many instances this was accompanied 
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by real transformation as well. But the ideals which drove the struggle seem to have 
been undercut and frustrated nearly twenty years after „freedom‟. As the ANC attempted 
to consolidate the hegemonic project, their practices changed, from a unity based upon 
national liberation under the charismatic leadership of Nelson Mandela, and buttressed 
by the respected Truth and Reconciliation Commission, to an insular model where even 
internal dissent and discussion were stifled; “[r]eflexes of denigration and dismissal won 
out, allowing miscalculations and mistakes to become debacles that drained public trust 
and eroded the confidence of allies” (Marais, 2011: 401). Leftist rhetoric is used by the 
government but becomes merely “symbols of affinity rather than literal descriptions” 
(Marais, 2011: 405). The Reconstruction and Development Programme was designed 
to uplift the poor, and in official discourse reached near mythical status, but again the 
rhetoric was empty; “massive job losses could not be reconciled with the goal of 
creating jobs and moving towards full employment. Likewise, the guarantee of a living 
wage could not be made to fit a reality in which many employed workers live in poverty, 
nor could a commitment to reduce income disparities square with a reality of widening 
gaps” (Marais,2011: 404). The attachment of these deeper meanings to symbols such 
as the national liberation movement and the RDP can be seen as an “attempt to make 
the administrative system independent of the formation of legitimating will” (Habermas, 
1973: 657). The deployment of these symbols can focus attention on the themes the 
leadership desires and banish, at least temporarily, uncomfortable facts from the minds 
of the public. 
The revolving door between the upper stratum of the ANC and parastatal organisations, 
as well as private enterprises, created a culture where patronage thrived. Though the 
process is, at best, morally ambiguous, the recently acquired, and fabulous, wealth of a 
few well-connected individuals serves a particular purpose. It “not only kindles the 
ambitions of the tiny coterie of individuals able to capitalise on the new opportunities, it 
also decorates the private yearnings of millions more. Publically denigrated but privately 
envied, African-elite advancement carries strong symbolic meaning” (Marais, 2011: 
407). On a broader level, South Africa transformed into an „internationalized competition 
state‟ with the characteristics of being coopted into transnational neoliberal institutions; 
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it embraces a macroeconomic policy based upon global financial markets, self-sufficient 
markets have been dismantled in favour of pursuing the policy of comparative 
advantage, and macroeconomic interventions are carried out with improving the 
business environment; “[i]n short, this is a state governed by the market, is a product of 
global capitalism, and is a post-Westphalian imposition by transnational capital” (Satgar, 
2008: 59). This broad phenomenon has been observed as creating “a new disjuncture 
between institutional capacity to provide public goods and the structural characteristics 
of a much larger-scale, global economy”(Cerny, 1995: 598). This challenges the state 
with “crises of both organizational efficiency and institutional legitimacy” (Cerny, 1995: 
598).  
4.4.3 Global and local crises 
South Africa constitutes “a non-hegemonic state in a Gramscian sense” (Leysens, 2012: 
2). There exists “a provisional and wavering hegemonic project” (Marais, 2011: 394) 
consisting of a coalition of interests who must “utilize both [their] structural and direct 
power to constitute a historical bloc of social forces capable of advancing the Afro-
neoliberal project (Satgar, 2009: 62). Cox argues that the nature of the state is defined 
“by the class structure on which it rests” (Cox, 1987: 6) This means that “state actions 
are constrained by knowledge on the part of the state‟s agents of what the class 
structure makes possible and what it precludes” (Cox, 1987: 7). Given recent events in 
South Africa, to be discussed later, it may be, arguably, that the dominant elite have 
begun to overreach their constraints. However, thus far, the non-hegemonic project 
seems to be marked not by a radical transformation of society. This is in keeping with 
the assertion that “[s]ocieties in which a dominant class […] has not established 
hegemony are in a condition of „stalemate‟” (Leysens, 2008: 81). This can also be 
termed a passive revolution. A passive revolution “refers to the redirection of historical 
processes in order to reproduce capitalism” (Satgar, 2008: 42). A passive revolution 
occurs during a period in which the balance of forces allows for a fundamental change 
in the organisation of power and production. But, “in such moments progressive forces 
lose the initiative and things change but not in a radical direction […] In short capitalism 
succeeds in reproducing itself, even as a new form” (Satgar, 2008: 43). The initiative is 
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usurped through many means, including a co-option of the leadership of social forces, 
accommodating the demands of some groups with the intention of sowing division 
amongst the popular movement, and a discourse of revolutionary rhetoric, but 
practically used to neutralise the social forces rather than empower them and ensure 
the reproduction of capital. However, in the South African case, the dominant groups 
“resemble the cartel arrangements found in states where consensus (of the Gramscian 
kind) has not been established and the legitimacy of the dominant form of accumulation 
and the accompanying state, among the excluded or marginalised social forces, is 
questioned” (Leysens, 2012: 25). 
There are a number of factors which indicate South Africa‟s economic fragility and the 
likelihood that the country may be moving toward a period of instability. The 
ramifications of the global crisis in particular could be quite destructive. This could only 
be avoided by adopting an insular macroeconomic policy, which, even if implemented 
now, may be too little too late. The insular policy would isolate the economy from the 
global market in an attempt to lessen the impact of external factors and shocks (Meyer, 
Doyle, Gagnon and Henderson, 2002: 14). The effect of the vagaries of the global 
economic system on South Africa will be explored later. First analysed, however, will be 
domestic factors which are troublesome and, even without the global complications, 
could indicate a precipice ahead. Between 1994 and 2009, South Africa was host to 
“the world‟s largest property and financial bubbles” (Bond, 2010: 16). Additionally, there 
was a racial division in the wealth of households. Between 1995 and 2005, “black 
households lost 1.8% of their income […] while white households gained 40.5%” (Bond, 
2010: 18; cf. Bhorat, van der Westhuizen and Jacobs, 2009). Over a similar period, 
although frequent reassurance was given by the erstwhile Finance Minister, Trevor 
Manuel, that there was macroeconomic stability, South Africa witnessed more currency 
volatility than any other emerging market (Bond, 2010: 16).  
In 2009, The Economist produced an analysis of emerging markets based largely upon 
data from HSBC. Of the 17 “large economies” shown, South Africa was rated at the 
highest risk of succumbing to contagion from the European and North American woes 
(The Economist, 2009). The index upon which this was evaluated reflected “expected 
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current account deficits, short-term debt as a percentage of foreign exchange reserves, 
and the ratio of banks‟ loans to deposits” (Cramer, Johnston and Oya 2009: 648). This 
was largely due to capital outflows to London or Melbourne resulting in a large current 
account deficit and causing the foreign debt to rise from $25 billion in 1994 to $80 billion 
in 2008 (Bond, 2010: 16). The global crisis has also made “portfolio investors […] wary 
of emerging markets, including South Africa” (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2009: 
B3). While South Africa did show a regular 5% growth of GDP during the 2000s, it was 
mostly due to credit expansion, as household debt to disposable income ratios 
increased from 50% to 80% between 2005 and 2008 and bank lending rose from 100% 
of GDP to 135% during the same period (Bond, 2010: 16). It was found that in 2011 
South Africa had “3.5-million consumers [who] were three months or more behind with 
their credit payments, which was 19% of all credit active consumers” (Hedley, 2012). 
Other analysts concur with the grim forecasts. Over the “18 years since the end of white 
minority rule, [South Africa] has rarely looked so shaky. Mining, the bedrock of the old 
economy, is in crisis as costs rise and commodity prices fall. Wildcat strikes are 
spreading across the industry and into other sectors” (Business Day, 2012). The result 
is that firms “are losing production, and the recognised unions, with which business was 
able to barter in the past, have lost influence over the labour force” (Business Day, 
2012). 
South Africa‟s economy is the largest in Africa, and is a relative giant in southern Africa. 
Much of this comes from the position which the country holds in the semi-periphery and 
the fact that since the end of apartheid, South Africa‟s economic policy has been 
grounded in “international openness and the benefits of foreign investment” (Cramer et 
al, 2009: 648). This linkage with the struggling global North makes for a particular 
sensitivity to the crisis which affects the North. During the immediate aftermath of the 
financial crisis, “[s]ome $5.7 billion in portfolio investment left South Africa during the 
fourth quarter of 2008, up from $1 billion outflow in the third quarter… [and] foreign 
direct investment fell to 3.3 billion Rand in the fourth quarter from 22.4 billion Rand in 
the third quarter” (Cramer et al, 2009: 648; cf. World Bank). In the first quarter of 2009, 
exports fell by another 24% as demand dried up and commodity prices fell (Marais, 
2009: 3). The early effects of the crisis on resource-based economies were dramatic. In 
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southern Africa the lack of global demand for diamonds caused “mine closures in 
Botswana and Namibia, copper mines shut down in Zambia, and in South Africa the 
mining sector contracted by an annualized 32.8 per cent in the first quarter of 2009. 
Industrial output fell in 2008 and 2009 in South Africa and Angola” (Cramer et al, 2009: 
650). African exporters are dangerously dependent on the health of financial institutions 
in the countries to which they export their products, while African economies are 
affected more by financial crises, as they rely less on manufacturing and more on 
primary exports (Berman and Martin, 2010: 7). The manufacturing sector has contracted 
by 20% and this decrease has broader ramifications (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 
2009). There has been “a failure to robustly embark on sector-specific industrial strategy 
innovations, despite much work undertaken in the recent past” (Frye, 2009: 11). 
Manufacturing faces “steep competition from imports that undercut local production. 
Limited local demand due to the high levels of poverty acts as a further brake to the 
expansion and deepening of local production and manufacturing” (Frye, 2009: 11). The 
disparities between the rich and the poor leave the wealthy reliant upon many imported 
goods as the domestic demand can support enough production to maintain value added 
national industries. 
In keeping with neo-liberal dogma, the South African Treasury “relaxed exchange 
controls more than two dozen times since 1994” (Marais, 2009: 3). However, the 
vestigial remnants of apartheid-era controls, “might have cushioned the South African 
financial sector from the worst of the initial toxic debt-driven crisis in global financial 
markets” (Marais, 2009: 3). Despite this, the outlook for the South African economy is 
far from rosy. Factories are idle and mines uncompetitive, “and local private investment 
is very unlikely to drive a quick recovery. Public investment will have to pick up the slack 
– but it accounts for a minor share of total investment in South Africa” (Marais, 2009: 3).  
Not everyone believes that salvation lies in a repudiation of capital and neoliberalism. In 
a letter from the Africa Business Forum to the G-8 leaders, it is remarked that “[t]his is, 
therefore, a time for increased efforts of all partners and sticking to the fundamentals 
which we know will sustain growth – open markets, good financial management, 
investment in human and physical infrastructure to improve competitiveness, and good 
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governance” (Skinner, 2008). Despite such assurances, South Africa has adopted a 
framework to guide the state‟s reaction to the crisis which does deviate from some of 
the doctrines espoused by those in the West. The Framework for South Africa‟s 
Response to the International Economic Crisis enumerates the priorities of the 
government‟s actions. First, the “collective responsibility is to work together to withstand 
the crisis and ensure that the poor and the most vulnerable are protected as far as 
possible from its impact” (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2009: C1). Another priority is 
“to ensure that all of our activities are aimed at strengthening the capacity of the 
economy to grow and create decent jobs in the future, are protected and supported as 
far as possible. By decent work we mean the need to increase the level of employment 
as well as improve the quality of jobs” (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2009: 
C2).Some of the main planks of the response consisted of a construction boom leading 
up to the 2010 World Cup and the Expanded Public Works Program, the latter being 
planned since the Mbeki-era and consisting mainly of short-term, unskilled employment 
for activities such as building pathways and sidewalks (Verick, 2012; Expanded Public 
Works Programme). “[T]he jobs were short term and had limited positive impact on the 
lives of the targeted unemployed people” (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2009: 4.7). 
These responses to the economic downturn are unlikely to drive recovery or provide 
macroeconomic benefits in the long-term. The domestic factors enumerated above 
portray an economy which seems reminiscent of the situation in the US prior to their 
financial crisis. South Africa‟s economic performance is “strongly integrated into the 
world economy and significantly dependent on its good health” (Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group, 2009: B6). As their global partners are hardly a picture of robust 
economic health, it would seem that the economic situation will be destined for further 
difficulties. What remains to be seen is how long the process will take, and how dire the 
situation will become, before it improves, and if the way forward will provide a radical 
change, a real „second transition‟, or leave an economy and society subordinated to the 
global market, and unable to truly emerge. 
One critical factor affecting the South African economy is unemployment. This also 
creates more pervasive social problems. The official unemployment rate is 24 percent 
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(Kelto, 2012). This does not compare well with other „emerging markets‟, particularly 
BRICS members Brazil, with a jobless rate of 5.8 percent, and India at 9.8 percent 
(Kelto, 2012). South Africa‟s unemployment figure amounts to 4.5 million individuals. It 
excludes 2.3 million who are „discouraged work seekers‟, meaning they have simply 
stopped trying to find a job (Cohen and Martinez, 2012). The statistics do include, 
however, some trades which may not be considered adequate for self-sufficiency: 
hunting wild animals, begging, and growing one‟s own food among them (Bond, 2009: 
16). The informal work sector is 7.1 million individuals. Employment levels and 
prospects become especially gloomy when regarding the youth demographic. Of those 
between the ages of 15 and 30, 63% are unemployed and of this group, 66% have 
never had a job (Frye, 2009: 10). The economic crisis has worsened the situation. 
During the 2010 State of the Nation address, President Jacob Zuma stated that the 
result of the recent global credit crunch was that approximately 900 000 jobs were lost 
in South Africa in 2009 (Zuma, 2010). But it appeared that, in many ways, under his 
leadership the government was taking a wait-and-see approach, as he counselled that 
“[e]ven if the economy begins to grow again next year, we will have to wait a little longer 
for a significant increase in new job creation. It always takes some time, even years, 
after growth starts, for jobs to be created in significant numbers” (Zuma, 2009). The 
ANC has committed to “creat[ing] 5 million jobs and slash[ing] the unemployment rate to 
14 percent by 2020” (Cohen and Martinez, 2012). However these goals require a 
sustained economic expansion of 7 percent each year, compared with the current paltry 
growth of slightly more than 2% (Cohen and Martinez, 2012). 
Apart from poverty and unemployment, South Africa has already seen morbid effects 
arising from the destitution of the lower socioeconomic classes. In many areas there are 
emphatic reactions to the destabilising effects of globalisation, “claims of authenticity 
and entitlement are a typical response, with anxiety usually displaced on the victimised, 
proximate and, oddly, familiar sections of society” (Marais, 2011: 422; cf. Appadurai, 
2006) The economic crisis has exacerbated these problems. Occasionally, the protests 
unfortunately tend to direct their frustrations at:  
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“local „others‟ […] eg the low-paid Zimbabwean migrant worker seen as 
 part of a scab labour force, the Mozambicans who cram into housing, 
 thus driving up rents, and the Somalis and Pakistanis who purchase goods 
 in bulk and under-price local „spaza shop‟ retailers whose small levels of 
 trade require higher relative mark-ups than the immigrant competitors 
 charge” (Bond, 2012: 261). 
 
South Africa has, in the past, had strong social movements which advocated and 
achieved positive changes in society. Historically, apartheid provided an identifiable 
adversary to confront. The rules by which it governed were easily understood as unjust. 
This bred a vibrant challenge from diverse actors. But with liberation, many of these 
movements were co-opted into the government or faded away as success was seen to 
have been achieved. However, this relative peace did not last long. The Anti-
Privatisation Forum, based in Johannesburg, though now defunct, proved a salient 
example in its time. Responsibility, and profits, for water services in Johannesburg had 
been granted to the French company Suez. This led to cutoffs for customers who could 
not pay and a variety of other ills, even the inability to use water to stop fires (Bond and 
Dugard, 2008: 1). Through 2005 and 2006 this spurred unrest and legal challenges. The 
action eventually culminated in the Johannesburg municipality‟s resumption of 
responsibility for water services (Bond, 2009: 12). 
 The Treatment Action Campaign is another movement which achieved a degree of 
success. The campaign advocates for “[a] unified quality health care system which 
provides equal access to HIV prevention and treatment services for all people” 
(Treatment Action Campaign). The movement came about in reaction to the South 
African government‟s refusal to provide anti-retroviral medication, which has a dramatic 
effect on the longevity and quality of life of those whose suffer from HIV and AIDs. 
Eventually, through these campaigns, the treatment was provided (Bond, 2005). Health 
and water are among the most basic of needs for human life and dignity and it would 
seem commonsensical that the weakest members of society‟s needs would be met in 
these regards. Yet, many other South African movements also struggle for basic 
necessities. Abahlali baseMjondolo (Shack Dwellers) began in Durban. Together with 
Landless People's Movement (Gauteng), the Rural Network (KwaZulu-Natal) and the 
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Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign they form the Poor People‟s Alliance. Abahlali 
baseMjondolo defines its goals as “[L]and & Housing in the City […] but it has also  
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successfully politicised and fought for an end to forced removals and for access to 
education and the provision of water, electricity, sanitation, health care and refuse 
removal as well as bottom up popular democracy” (Abahlali baseMjondolo).  
Recent developments do not present a more heartening portrait. South Africa‟s primary 
education system remains in an abysmal state. It ranks “132nd out of 144 countries for 
its primary education and 143rd for the quality of science and maths. In the Department 
of Basic Education‟s national literacy and numeracy tests last year, only 15% of 12 year 
olds scored at or above the minimum proficiency on the language test” (The Economist, 
2012). 12% met this level in maths. (The Economist, 2012) The mining sector is also 
facing severe challenges. On 16 August 2012 34 striking miners were killed in a police 
action at the Lonmin platinum mine in the North West Province. The other workers 
eventually received a raise in wages. This led, however, to more strikes throughout the 
country. “75,000 miners, chiefly of gold and platinum, went on strike, mostly illegally” 
(The Economist, 2012). Anglo American Platinum, the largest producer of platinum in 
the world, fired 12,000 workers, while Gold One has fired 1,400. The labour unrest 
spread to the transport sector, where 20,000 truck drivers went on strike, prompting 
shortages of various products. The latter dispute has been resolved for the time being, 
but it would seem unlikely that the general labour strife has been put to rest. This has 
spooked foreign investors, as on October 8th, $643 million dollars flowed out of the 
South African markets. (The Economist, 2012) 
Protests are currently widespread, often labelled as advocating „service delivery‟. Their 
character includes “resistance to the commodiﬁcation of life, eg commercialisation of 
municipal services, and to rising poverty and inequality in the country‟s slums” (Bond, 
2012: 261). The problems are being recognised by leaders in the top tier of South 
Africa‟s government. Zwelenzima Vavi, the general secretary of Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) articulated that “different lifestyles and material 
realities are creating a leadership which is not fully in tune with what members are 
facing” (The Economist, 2012).  
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The incident at Marikana seems likely to have ramifications for the relationship between 
labour, capital and the state in South Africa. It is difficult to say what these may be; 
however, it is possible to analyse some of the occurrences which have surrounded this 
contemporary event. One of the definitive consequences following Marikana is the 
weakening of the legitimacy of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), and, by 
association, COSATU, with whom they are affiliated, which in turn affects the governing 
tripartite alliance. This has been demonstrated by the emergence of movements outside 
the structures of organised labour and their agreements with the capitalist ownership of 
the mines, namely, workers committees unaffiliated to the union movements and the 
rise, albeit on a small stage and still in its infancy, of a new umbrella coalition of Leftist 
interests, most prominently in the form of the Democratic Socialist Movement (DSM). 
 The committees will first be contextualised. Previously, union representation in the 
Northwest province‟s mines was generally either affiliated to NUM, or to a smaller 
offshoot, the Association of Mine Workers and Construction Union (AMCU). However, 
“[w]orkers at Lonmin, like workers all over the Rustenburg mines, decided to secure 
maximum unity in action by forming a worker‟s committee without links to either NUM or 
AMCU” (Ashley, 2012). They articulated their demands as a R12 500 monthly salary, 
equal pay for equal work, ending subcontracting, and better safety standards within the 
mines (Ashley, 2012). From these beginnings, they later formed a Joint Strike 
Coordinating Committee, “which co-ordinates the strikes of the wider Rustenburg mines, 
including Anglo Platinum, Samancor and Royal Bafokeng Platinum” (Ashley, 2012). The 
coordinating committee based in Rustenburg expanded their members and ambit, as 
“[o]n 13 October, over 120 mineworkers representing strike committees from across the 
industry met to assess the state of the strike and map a way forward” (Democratic 
Socialist Movement, 2012). This included, for the first time, representation from outside 
the North West Province; gold mines from Gauteng and platinum mines in Limpopo, 
resulting from the shift from the Rustenburg-based committee to a National Strike 
Coordinating Committee, with further exploratory contact made with coal mines in  
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Mpumalanga, gold mines in the Free State, and diamond mines in the Northern Cape 
(Democratic Socialist Movement, 2012). As approximately 100 000 mine workers were 
on strike across the country, (Ashley, 2012) in what started off as organic, but isolated, 
movements, the intention, or at least desire, to coordinate this formidable force could, if 
continued cooperation is achieved, represent a coherent, and strong, grouping of social 
forces. 
The second phenomenon to be briefly discussed is the ascendance of the DSM. They 
have roundly condemned the violence propagated by the state against the striking 
workers. Additionally, they have called for a mass workers‟ movement, irrespective of 
union affiliation, partly due to the compromised status of these unions by their 
association with the ANC and mining capital (Democratic Socialist Movement). Their 
advocacy covers a broad variety of topics, ranging from: jobs, both increased numbers 
and better quality working environments; a R3500 minimum wage; free universal health 
care; gender equality, especially pertaining to the most vulnerable members of society, 
abused women and sex workers; free, and quality public education, including an end to 
privatised education and a strategy to promote literacy; houses , water, and sanitation 
for everyone; an efficient and integrated public transport system; transparent democracy 
within trade unions, and the exit of COSATU from the tripartite alliance; solidarity among 
workers, including an end to xenophobia and substantive integration with workers‟ 
movements in other states; nationalisation of monopoly-owned commercial farms and 
state price controls to establish domestic food security; nationalisation of Reserve Bank, 
commercial banks, and top companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange; the 
formation of a mass workers party; and for “a Socialist South Africa, a socialist Africa 
and a socialist world” (Democratic Socialist Movement). These goals are ambitious. Yet, 
through their association with the popular movements the DSM has gained some 
traction, at least in the North West Province, organising “‟strike committees‟ in all shafts” 
to empower labour in the conflict against capital. (Mkentane, 2012) This is in contrast to 
former ANC Youth League leader, Julius Malema, who has also been involved in 
condemning the government‟s response to the strikes; this, the DSM suggests, is simply 
“aimed at advancing the ambitions of aspirant black capital in the country, rather than 
creating a more equal society” (Mkentane, 2012). 
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The success of these movements remains to be seen. They have already earned both 
bouquets and brickbats. Claims that the events “spreading across the country like a 
virus [are] not just about wages and living conditions, [they are] about something much 
bigger. It is the contagious birth struggle of an emerging socialist movement that could 
deliver a new labour party to South Africa” (De Waal, 2012), may prove to be overly 
optimistic. However the hyperbole is no less from institutional sources, with COSATU 
general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi claiming that the workers‟ committees, the DSM, and 
other activities occurring outside of the formal structures of the unions as “extremely 
divisive” and “not only dangerous, but suicidal” (Merten, 2012). This is hardly an 
objective assessment as the movement of workers away from COSATU directly affects 
the legitimacy of the movement which he leads. In the aftermath of the Marikana 
killings, COSATU remained silent and did not issue a condemnation of international 
capital nor lead a mobilisation of workers; a glaring failure at a time where, in a 
Gramscian sense, “many cried out for a shift from the War of Position to a War of 
Movement” (Bond, 2012a).  
The gains which have been made by the organic workers‟ movements, and possible 
successes, are fragile for a number of reasons. There is a preponderance of migrant 
workers, resulting in a division of attention and resources between the local 
communities surrounding the mines, and families in far-flung locales, and also the 
nature of the migrant communities also allows threatening possibilities of xenophobia. In 
these communities, there exist illicit drugs, sex workers, patriarchy, diverse traditional 
spiritual beliefs, labour brokerage, and other exploitative relations (Bond, 2012a). 
Additionally destabilising is the insertion of financialisation and debt into these 
communities, through micro-finance and short term loans with high interest rates, “from 
established banks – one (Ubank) even co-owned by NUM and another (Capitec) replete 
with powerful ANC patrons – down to fly by night „mashonisha‟ loan sharks” (Bond, 
2012a). Thus, although membership is leaving the ANC and COSATU related structures 
for alternative movements, the positions of the workers are fragile, due to their low 
socio-economic position, as well as fragmented communities. The situation does begin 
“to unveil the intrinsic anti-socialist tendencies associated with the ANC-Alliance‟s elite 
transition from revolutionaries to willing partners of some of the world‟s most wicked 
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corporations” (Bond, 2012a). Yet, although South Africa has “amongst the highest 
protest rates in the world, the lack of connectivity between those with grievances is a 
crippling problem” (Bond, 2012a). Marikana demonstrated the declining legitimacy of 
the ANC and that COSATU is no longer representative of their membership. The violent 
reaction also revealed the darker coercive side which could be used by the elite 
alliance. It will remain to be seen whether a sustained, coherent, progressive, 
movement will emerge from the killings in the North West Province. 
The ANC, and its allies, remain the dominant actor in South Africa and could continue in 
this form, though this will require a continuous remaking and adaptation of their project, 
as there exists no other political or social force which can provide a direct rival. 
However, “as long as the central terms of the project - the pre-eminence of capital 
accumulation over the wellbeing of citizens – stays unchanged, hegemony is unlikely to 
be achieved. The underlying crisis will remain unresolved and will generate increasing 
instability” (Marais, 2011: 394). South Africa locked into the global economic order and 
this diminishes the space which there is to manoeuvre. The entire project rests on an 
elite bargain and a passive revolution. Generally, the ruling coalition of interest consists 
of transnational South African corporations, both private and parastatal; foreign 
transnational corporations involved in finance, production and trade; high level 
government bureaucrats, especially those who interact with the global economy; the 
Black capitalist class, whether in the private or public sector; some members of the 
upper echelon of the ANC, especially those who adhere to global capitalism; a portion 
of the working class who have realised success through union investment vehicles or 
employment with transnational capital; and finally, much of the corporate media, 
especially those whose writing concerns finance (Satgar, 2008; 65). Though formerly a 
relatively unified liberation movement, the ANC no longer represent a coherent 
leadership structure. Rather, they represent a coalition of interests through which 
different goals can be furthered. This puts a premium on retaining power, “not for any 
single goal, but in order to facilitate the pursuit of disparate objectives” (Marais, 2011: 
427). 
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Although the struggle for national liberation was led by the working class, the initiative 
was lost and “replaced by a top down, technocratic and elitist Afro-neoliberal project” 
(Satgar, 2008: 52). The public embodiment of this movement is the ANC who have 
demonstrated unparalleled strength in elections since the advent of democracy, even as 
their level of support has been steadily declining, as “the party‟s (proportional) share of 
the vote dropped to 65.9% in the 2009 elections (from 69.7% in 2004)” (Leysens, 2012: 
25). However, a unified society consists of more than electoral results. It is more 
comprehensive, including “the relationship between the masses and leaders, rulers and 
ruled in a dynamic process of articulating a political project that is defining of the 
authority to lead society” (Satgar, 2008: 53) If this relationship is severed, “[i]nstead of 
hegemony the logic of dominance prevails” (Satgar, 2008: 53) The ability to reproduce 
the hegemonic project is weakened by the “continuing reproduction of inequality, 
difficulties in improving the wellbeing of impoverished South Africans at the pace and on 
the scale required; the weakening of the ANC as a mobilising and disciplining presence 
in communities;” as well as dynamics of the ANC, including the threat of a dissolution of 
the tripartite alliance and a general lack of trustworthy leadership. (Marais, 2011: 394) 
The ideological foundations of the non-hegemonic project are diverse, and in some 
ways contradictory. They include a commitment to liberal democracy, although this 
commitment appears to be decreasing as partisan interests undermine the 
independence of the judiciary and media (The Economist, 2012), alongside a view that 
some Constitutional principles are “alien to dominant traditions and values (Marais, 
2011: 414). The ideological foundations also include a rejection of apartheid‟s social 
and political structures and a belief in growth as the guiding macroeconomic principle, 
alongside a desire to eradicate poverty. (Marais, 2011: 395) This ideological programme 
is varied and even conflicting, which reflects the contradictions embodied in South 
African society. Because of this, mustering consent requires ungainly and unstable 
balancing acts” (Marais, 2011: 399). Indeed, there has been a turn of late, especially 
under the Zuma administration, to eschew some of the unifying myths which were 
incorporated during the first years of ANC governance; most notably in the notion of 
reverence for the constitution and the rejection of certain socially liberal stances for 
those which follow a more traditionally conservative path. The secular nature of society 
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under the Mbeki and Mandela administrations has been challenged under Zuma, who 
has publically portrayed a much more overt and fundamentalist version of Christianity, a 
religious group to which 75% of South African‟s proclaim they belong (De Waal, 2012a). 
Beyond secularism, there have also been threats towards other personal freedoms, 
such as homosexuality (Marais, 2011: 416). While this right is enshrined in the 
constitution, the belief in this policy does not necessarily garner the support of the 
majority of South African‟s, thus, the denigration or disenfranchisement of such 
individuals and choices demonstrates a rejections of personal freedoms in favour of 
pandering to a conservative, less tolerant, society. Additionally, there is an increase in 
the severity of the security apparatus, even beyond the conspicuous events at 
Marikana. Police enforcement is encouraged to be more ruthless, as “one can argue 
that the „shoot to kill‟ approach promoted by top government officials [assigns] to police 
officers the status of both judge and executioner” (Marais, 2011: 415). It is not possible 
to say that at this time these constitute a broad trend in society. Yet, the behaviour and 
statements of some in the upper circles of government reveal a shift from inclusive, 
socially liberal and constitution ideological mythmaking in the 1990s, to a less tolerant, 
more conservative, and generally divisive pattern at present.  
4.5 What is to be done? 
The current situation is indeed a crisis. It is also perhaps a fork in the road, much as the 
crisis in the 1920s and 1930s was for the financial and political system. While we 
currently are not facing the threat of world war, as was experienced twice in the 20th 
century, the world is experiencing an inordinate level of violent conflict; some examples 
include the ongoing instability in Libya following the dissolution of Muammar Gadhafi‟s 
government; Somalia‟s continuing inability to form a central government and the conflict 
that this, coupled with foreign intervention, generates; foreign occupation and the 
indigenous reaction in Afghanistan; unrest throughout the Arab world following the 
tumultuous Arab Spring; and the seemingly intractable conflict in the eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo; to name but a few (Foreign Policy, 2012: 85-99). This, 
along with the malaise of the financial system and the associated legitimation crisis of 
the hegemonic project could suggest that the global hegemon is losing or is about to 
lose its grasp on power. This chapter has focused on the crisis using the theoretical 
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structure discussed in Chapter 2. It started with a Marxist approach to acquire a holistic 
historical materialist perspective of the contemporary situation. This was followed by an 
analysis of South Africa, a state in the semi-periphery of the World System, to 
understand the consequences of the crisis on the intermediary level of the global 
hierarchy. Crises provide an opportunity for a critical re-examination of the systems 
which surround them. This moment is no different. As of yet, no broad, productive, 
fundamental reforms have been made. When looking at the South African context, the 
future does not appear to be progressing toward more stable and materially secure 
times. Instead, unless there is a concerted effort to reshape society and the economic 
policies by which it is governed, further societal instability is likely to occur. Potential 
counter-hegemonic movements are characterised by general disarray. Their weakness 
exists for a variety of reasons, co-option by the elite, systematic attacks, both overt and 
covert, with the intention to discredit their positions, and the dissemination of rhetoric 
and consciousness which bolsters the dominant project, among others. 
 Thus, despite the economic, social, and ensuing legitimation crisis, the prevailing 
coalition of social forces related to production and finance appears likely to continue to 
cobble together their dominant project. Elements of the project may be unravelling, 
especially in regards to “increasing dissatisfaction among the economically 
marginalised” (Leysens, 2012: 2) and the lack of support, if not outright opposition, of 
organised labour, at least at a grassroots level, while COSATU remains engaged in the 
tripartite alliance. The killings at the Marikana platinum mine aptly demonstrate that as 
consent wanes, control may be exercised more often through coercive force. In fact, as 
protests spread, and worsen, it shows that South Africa has, thus far, been unable to 
establish “hegemony where coercion is the exception to consensus” (Leysens, 2012: 
25). Rhetoric from the governing ANC seems insufficient to reverse this trend, as do 
policy prescriptions. As the party prepares for an internal elective conference in 
Mangaung, currently characterised by factional disarray, their legitimacy will, most likely, 
continue to erode, as many citizens needs remain unmet while their leaders jockey for 
position within the party structures. The dearth of alternatives, both electorally and in 
widespread popular movements, mean that, most likely, this descent will continue. 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
“Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, 
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere 
The ceremony of innocence is drowned; 
The best lack all conviction, while the worst 
Are full of passionate intensity.” 
Yeats, W.B. (1920) 
“The Enlightenment is dead, Marxism is dead, the working class 
movement is dead … and the author does not feel very well either”   
Neil Smith; cited in Harvey (1989: 305). 
The current economic crisis continues to have negative implications for many 
throughout the world. It has resulted in the most formidable challenge to the ideology 
which underlies the capitalist system since the Great Depression. By some 
measurements, the present situation is markedly worse. This thesis has regarded the 
economic crisis from a critical perspective. To understand the global structures, and the 
events occurring within them, a theoretical framework based upon the writings of Marx 
has been used. To sufficiently broaden and update his perspectives, a World Systems 
approach, along with contributions from Gramsci, have also been used.. This synthesis 
allows for the conceptualisation of a World System based upon capital and the 
associated class struggle which its mode of accumulation engenders. Paramount in this 
global hierarchy is the hegemon, at present, in the form of the United States of America 
(US). Along with this, in Chapter 2, the contributions of Robert Cox are integrated into 
the conceptualisation; whereby social forces are those who legitimate or effectively 
oppose a hegemonic project. This is examined in the case of South Africa. The study 
has argued that the economic crisis has caused a legitimation crisis and thus provided 
the opportunity for an emancipatory transformation of the global political economy. 
However, the weakness of potential counter-movements means that the crisis is more 
likely to result in a passive revolution than a transformative change. 
According to Marx and Engels‟, “all history has been a history of class struggles” (Marx 
and Engels, 2010: 6). These struggles are centred on the conflict between the 
proletariat, who act as labour, and the bourgeoisie, who control capital. Similarly, the 
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process of historical change is driven by the dynamics of this struggle. Relational 
structures, from societal to familial, are determined by the manner in which labour is 
organised and their mode of production. As the means of productions change, so too do 
the relations of production. This in turn, affects all other aspects of life. The worker, in 
Marx time - 18th century Britain - was disconnected from the fruits of his labours, and 
realised a small task as part of a complex whole. This alienation from the products one 
creates is much more pronounced in the present than it was then. (Harvey, 2009; 
Burnham, 1994) The capitalist class continues to accumulate in higher proportions (See 
Chapter 3). Labour finds their relative, if not absolute - a conceptual distinction which is 
imperative to refute claims of modern prosperity – wealth declining. Yet, capital remains 
dependent upon labour, for production and consumption, although the temporal and 
spatial reorganisation which has accompanied globalisation has altered the dynamics of 
this dictum. However, in general, the relative affluence of labour declines and their 
future prospects become more precarious, leaving capital with a disaffected workforce 
and a precarious market. This situation breeds instability and, eventually, large-scale 
crises.  
The current economic crisis was not, in a historical sense, unforeseen. In the 
Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels wrote about the structure of the system which 
produces these crises. It is cyclical in nature, and poses a more serious threat to the 
system with each return. Each crisis results in widespread destruction, of means of 
production, of relations of production, of capital and livelihoods. Every turn results in 
more extensive exploitation, thus placing the systemic structures on more perilous 
ground, as they must eventually exhaust themselves. The history of the capitalist 
system is fraught with crises, as is the history of the current World System (See Chapter 
3). It would be presumptuous - as Marx himself was on more than one occasion whilst 
remarking on contemporary events (See Wheen, 2007) – to say that this crisis 
represents the moment when the global capitalist system is bound for failure. Rather, it 
is instructive to consider that the contradictions of capitalism, at least over the last 
decades, have worsened, as have their accompanying crises. The notion of crisis has 
not escaped examination by, relatively, modern writers, upon whose thoughts and 
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actions much of the form of our modern economic system can be credited. John 
Maynard Keynes and Joseph Schumpeter both had notions about how a crisis affects 
society. Keynes believed that, while crises were intrinsic to the capitalist system, 
regulations and interventions could prevent, or at least ameliorate, their effects. 
Schumpeter also saw crises as natural, and for him they opened space for the creativity 
of capitalism, which, in the space that the associated destruction opened, could be 
reinvigorated and flourish (Burnham, 2010: 29). Capitalism does not appear vibrant; it 
seems contradictory and stale. Marx has been criticised on many fronts, as well as 
providing a framework for many writers who would either follow in his footsteps, or find 
his thoughts a coherent construction to oppose. Yet, his contributions to understanding 
the economic structures and relations which govern society, as well as the crises which 
accompany them, remain invaluable when examining our global structures today.  
The modern World System is characterised by an industrialised core and a less 
developed periphery. In practical terms, the core consists of Europe and North America, 
and the periphery of the global South. The core generally produces higher value 
products while the periphery is most often a repository of cheap labour and natural 
resources. This distinction is not absolute. Areas of the core can contain similarities to 
the periphery and the periphery can contain elements of the core. The respective 
societies themselves are not homogenous. Inequalities exist at both ends of the 
spectrum. Yet, “hegemony, though firmly established at the centre of the world order, 
wears thin in its peripheries. Actual revolts provoked by economic penetration ar[i]se in 
the peripheries, and the use of coercion [is] much more evident in these areas (Cox, 
1987: 150). There is also an intermediate level in this organisation; namely, the semi-
periphery. This study has examined the contradictions of capitalism at a broad level, but 
has also looked towards the semi-periphery as an area from which an emancipatory 
transformation could emerge, as the last socialist transformation occurred in this 
intermediary area. 
In this respect, the case of South Africa was discussed in Chapter 4. Indeed, the state-
society complex in South Africa does not constitute a hegemonic project. Rather, the 
ruling elite represent an unlikely coalition of interests, struggling to preserve their 
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dominant project. This project aims to serve the interests of an emerging dominant 
class, namely: the black middle class, black corporate elites who have reached the 
upper echelon of this area post-apartheid, “white majority owned (financial and 
productive) capital” and organised labour (Leysens, 2012: 26). Given the decline in the 
legitimacy of this project, with widespread protests, and the state resorting to ever more 
violent means to quell dissent, it would appear that elements of this project are 
unravelling. There also appears to be a shift from socially liberal ideals to a more 
conservative and divisive method of obtaining consensus. Although there has been 
discussion at the elite level of a partial rejection of the economic structures and policies 
agreed to during the transition, it is likely to prove mainly rhetorical, as “[t]he South 
African […] state, weak in capacity and the transitional phase of the current world order, 
pose[s] an enormous challenge to transforming the rhetoric into practice” (Leysens, 
2012: 27) The possibility of a Leftist challenge also remains unlikely. Mobilisations 
generally occur around local and isolated issues, rather than presenting a unified front 
demanding transformative action. It would appear that, given the unravelling of 
elements of the dominant project, coupled with the incoherence of the Left, for the time 
being, the situation is likely to continue, and even worsen, as the inequalities and 
contradictions in society become more pronounced. Recent events, most notably the 
violence at the Marikana platinum mine in the North West Province, have provided an 
impetus for some social forces to mobilise in a coherent manner. This mobilisation is 
marked by a rejection of official structures aligned to the tripartite alliance, in favour of 
worker‟s committees and nascent Leftist movements (see Chapter 4.4.3).  
This challenge can also be seen at the global level. The financial crisis of 2009 and the 
subsequent enduring recession, has demonstrated the legitimation crisis of the global 
hegemon, although it can be said that the US has been in decline for years prior to the 
financial crisis. Gramsci wrote that a hegemon exercises control through a combination 
of coercion and consent. The crisis has undermined the consensual nature of 
hegemonic practice. As a policy response, $21 trillion has been moved from the public 
to the private purse (McNally, 2012), given to the financial institutions which were 
ultimately responsible for precipitating the crisis. These policies have illuminated the 
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nature of accumulation within the US. This has prompted, worldwide, many movements 
opposing the hegemonic structures. These movements did not arise simply due to the 
financial crisis and the policy responses of the subsequent years. Many existed in both 
similar, and different, forms for some time. Yet, the crisis has provided a clear moment 
and policies against which articulate opposition can be raised. They, at this time, lack a 
coherent counter-hegemonic strategy.. The same is true for the general ideological 
position of the Left. Ideas proliferate, yet, as a whole, they lack the coherence and 
determination of the hegemon. The crisis has illustrated the lack of legitimacy which 
currently accompanies the hegemonic project; yet, the Left, and other possible counter-
movements, remain unable to present a realistic alternative. 
The study has attempted to examine the capitalist World System in light of the ongoing 
economic crisis. It has found that the responses from the hegemonic structures and 
institutions are insufficient to address the monumental obstacles and contradictions 
inherent in this system. Nor have populist mobilisation, and leftist ideological 
perspectives, provided a coherent counter-hegemonic model. This leaves the global 
economic and social structures in an uncomfortable state of flux, an “interregnum 
[where] a great variety of morbid symptoms appear” (Gramsci, 1971: 276). The 
inequalities engendered by the capitalist World System leave the legitimacy of the 
hegemonic project open to question. The current economic crisis, and the responses 
which have followed, only exacerbate this fact. This has prompted a crisis of legitimation 
for the World System, which has been characterised by liberal capitalism and US 
hegemony. However, without a coherent strategic challenge from the Left, or a radical 
correction by the hegemon, the contradictions of capital will continue to contribute to the 
demise of the hegemonic World System, and may result in an anarchic, global 
(dis)order. 
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